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ABSTR ACT
Prescription drug spending in the USA has soared, fueled by rising drug
prices. A critical mechanism for restraining drug prices is the formulary tier-
ing system. Although tiering should reflect the cost of a drug—and reward
patients who choose less-expensive drugs—something is seriously amiss.
Using Medicare claims data from roughly one million patients between
2010 and 2017, this article finds troubling amounts of distorted tiering
and wasted cost. Increasingly, generics are shifted to more expensive—and
therefore less accessible—tiers. The percentage of generics on the least-
expensive tier drops from 73% to 28%; the percentage of drugs on inappro-
priate tiers rises from 47% to 74%. Considering only costs paid by patients
and the federal Low-Income Subsidy Program, tier misplacement cumula-
tively costs society $13.25 billion over the time period. An unruly problem
demands a disruptive solution. This article advances the counterintuitive
regulatory reform that tiering should be based on a drug’s list price. Yes,
† Robin Feldman is the Arthur J. Goldberg Distinguished Professor of Law and Director of the
UC Hastings Law, Center for Innovation (C4i). Her work focuses on the role of intellectual property law
in technology and innovation, drug pricing and healthcare law, and artificial intelligence and data. She has
published four books,Drugs,Money,&SecretHandshakes:TheUnstoppableGrowthof PrescriptionDrug
Prices (Cambridge 2019); Drug Wars: How Big Pharma Raises Prices & Keeps Generics Off the Market
(Cambridge 2017), Rethinking Patent Law (Harvard 2012), and The Role of Science in Law (Oxford
2009), and more than 60 articles, including law journals at Harvard, Yale, and Stanford, and in the New
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list price—that roundly dismissed figure—should become the touchstone.
Thiswoulddeter incentive-distorting rebate schemeswhile recognizing that
many people already pay list price. It is a remarkably streamlined approach
for cutting through a wide swath of perverse incentives and manipulations.
K E Y W O R D S: drugs, formulary, pharmaceuticals, pricing, regulation, tier
I. INTRODUCTION: FORMULARY GAMES
Prescription drug spending in the USA has soared in the last decade, fueled by rising
drug prices.2 Designer drugs, arrivingwith stunning price tags, are grabbing headlines,3
but day-to-day increases on ordinary medications are causing their fair share of pain.
These includedmedicines for treating arthritis, diabetes, reflux, depression, high blood
pressure, and high cholesterol.4
The pain of these rising prices reverberates through many levels of the system,
including household consumer budgets. Nearly one in four Americans say that afford-
ing their prescription drugs is difficult, whereas three in 10 say they have not taken
2 SeeMedicarePaymentAdvisoryComm’n,ReporttotheCongress:MedicarePaymentPolicy,
408–9 (2017) (hereinafter MedPAC Report) (concluding that price increases in brand drugs are
overwhelming the effects of patients using lower-cost generics in Medicare); see also Cal. Office of
Statewide Health Planning and Development, Prescription Drug Wholesale Acquisition
Cost (WAC) Increases (2019) (detailing wholesale price increases of more than 16% for hundreds
of drugs between 2017 and Q2 of 2019) (hereinafter State of California Report); see also U.S.
Dep’t. of Health & Hum. Serv., Office of Inspector General, OEI-03-15-0080, Increases
in Reimbursement for Brand-Name Drugs in Part D, 4 (2018) (hereinafter HHS Inspector
General Report) (reporting that even after accounting for rebates, Medicare spending for brand-name
drugs increased 62% between 2011 and 2015 (Exhibit 3), despite a decrease in the number of prescriptions
(Exhibit 2)).
3 See, eg, Katie Thomas&ReedAbelson,The $6 Million Drug Claim,NYTimes (Aug. 25, 2019) (describing
the drug Strensiq, which treats a debilitating genetic disorder with an annual treatment cost of $2 million),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/25/health/drug-prices-rare-diseases.html (accessedOct. 30, 2020);
MegTirrell, A U.S. Drugmaker Offers to Cure Rare Blindness for $850,000, CNBC (Jan. 3, 2018) (detailing
$850,000 cost for Spark Therapeutics’ cure for a rare form of blindness), www.cnbc.com/2018/01/03/
spark-therapeutics-luxturna-gene-therapy-will-cost-about-850000.html (accessedOct. 30, 2020). Trends
in specialty drugs that are widely used by elderly Americans—generally, the most expensive drugs in the
healthcare system—are even more stark. The average annual retail price of specialty drugs nearly tripled
between 2006 and 2017, approaching $79,000 in 2017. See Stephen W. Schondelmeyer & Leigh Purvis,
Trends in Retail Prices of Specialty Prescription Drugs Widely Used by Older Americans: 2017 Year-End Update,
AARP Pub. Pol’y Inst. (2019).
4 See Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Fact sheet, Drug Spending Information Products
(2018) [listing the ten drugs with the highest annual price increases from 2012 to 2016 covered by Medi-
care, including Embrel (arthritis),Humira (arthritis), Januvia (diabetes), Lyrica (nerve pain associatedwith
diabetes), Xarelto (blood clots), and Crestor (high cholesterol)], https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-
sheets/drug-spending-information-products-fact-sheet (accessed Oct. 30, 2020); State of California
Report, supra note 2 [showing increases for the period of 2017 through mid-2019 of 31% for Lumigan
(glaucoma eye drops), 31% for Lexapro (antidepressant), 18% forWellbutrin (depression), 26% forDiovan
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their medicines as prescribed due to costs.5 Government budgets are strained as well,
as taxpayers support the increased costs ofMedicare, Medicaid, and other government
programs.6
With drug spending and other healthcare costs on the rise, healthcare has become
a key focus across the nation. Eighty percent of polled voters consider healthcare
an extremely or very important issue, more than any other topic.7 Moreover, the
anxiety about healthcare costs cuts across party lines: 87% of Democrats and 72%
of Republicans consider it a critical issue, making it the first and third most pressing
concern for each voter bloc, respectively.8 In the first four debates of the 2020 election,
Democratic presidential hopefuls spentmore timediscussing healthcare than anyother
topic—roughly twice as much as other frequently mentioned topics such as foreign
policy and climate change.9 In the polarized political climate of this era, one would be
hard pressed to think of another issue that so unifies the American public.
A critical mechanism for restraining drug spending is the formulary system, which
dictates the drugs for which patients will receive reimbursement. The roots of the
system can be traced back to the American Revolution—when the Continental army
developed a list of reliable medicines—although modern formulary systems have
gradually expanded far from their historic roots. Today’s formularies are divided into
tiers that determine just howmuch a patient will pay.When drugs are on low tiers, such
as Tiers 1 and 2, the patient pays less. When drugs are on high tiers, such as Tiers 4 and
5, the patient pays more.
In theory, tiering reflects the cost of a drug—and rewards patients who choose
generics over brands.10 The patient’s copay is less, the cost to the healthcare system
on the whole is less, and the market for cheaper drugs thrives. In other words, tiering
5 Kaiser Family Foundation, Public Opinion on Prescription Drugs and their Prices (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/slideshow/public-opinion-on-prescription-drugs-and-their-prices/ (accessed Oct.
30, 2020). Cf . Sara R. Collins, David C. Radley & Jesse C. Baumgartner, Trends in Employer Health Care
Coverage, 2008-2018: Higher Costs for Workers and Their Families, The Commonwealth Fund (2019).
6 See Robin Feldman, Drugs, Money, and Secret Handshakes: The Unstoppable Growth of
Prescription Drug Prices 6-7 (2019); see also MedPac Report, supra note 2, at 408–9 (describing
increased costs of Medicare); HHS Inspector General Report, supra note 2.
7 Frank Newport, Top Issues for Voters: Healthcare, Economy, Immigration, Gallup (Nov. 2, 2018), https://
news.gallup.com/poll/244367/top-issues-voters-healthcare-economy-immigration.aspx.
8 Id.
9 Hannah Brown & Dylan Scott, The Democratic Debates Have Spent 93 Minutes on Health Care, Vox (Oct.
15, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/10/15/20914415/democratic-debates-hea
lth-care-issues; Emmarie Huetteman,Healthcare Stayed Front and Center at the Democratic Debate, Kaiser
Health News (Oct. 16, 2019) https://khn.org/news/health-care-stayed-front-and-center-at-democra
tic-debate/.
10 See, eg, Copayment Tier Definitions, BlueCross BlueShield of North Carolina, https://www.blue
crossnc.com/understanding-insurance/how-drug-benefits-work/copayment-tier-definitions (accessed
Nov. 15, 2019) (chart explaining this health plan’s tiering system, asserting that on the two least-expensive
tiers, ‘most are generic’, on the next two tiers ‘most are brand’, and on the most-expensive tier, most are
highest-cost specialty drugs); see also Haiden A. Huskamp et al., The Impact of a Three-Tier Formulary on
Demand Response for Prescription Drugs, 14 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 729, 731 (2005) (discussing
how formulary-tier structures incentivize preferred drugs by placing preferred drugs on lower tiers, which
corresponds to lower copays for the individual consumer); John Jones, The Pros and Cons of Formularies,
6 J. Managed Care Pharm., 203, 203, n. 3 (2000) (article authored by PBM executive explaining that
tiering is designed to ‘encourage desirable outcomes while saving considerable costs . . . . Treatment—not
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should be part of a virtuous cycle creating the proper market and system incentives.
That is the concept, in theory, but something is seriously amiss. In fact, the tiering
system has gone off its rails.
Prior to this article, anecdotal evidencehad suggested that somethingodd is happen-
ing in the tiering system. Press reports and scattered lawsuits have hinted that at least
some health plans are punishing patients for purchasing generics, rather than brand-
name drugs, or excluding generics from reimbursement.11 In light of these clues, this
study set out to examine, on a systematic basis, whether tiers are doing their jobs.
The study follows roughly one million Medicare patients from 2010 to 2017. In the
process, the study finds clear evidence of widespread irrational tiering and wasted
spending. By placing costly brand-name drugs on preferred tiers while placing cheaper
generics on more-expensive tiers, the principal actors involved have cost patients and
the government billions of dollars.
To understand how dollars are wasted within the formulary system, the study
focuses on whether cheaper drugs are being placed on more-expensive tiers relative to
more expensive competitors. In order to define competing drugs, the study applies the
novel concept of ‘therapeutic competitors’, a term that has not been previously used in
the literature.
An existing termof art, ‘therapeutic equivalent’ is too narrow to fully capturemarket
dynamics. To be therapeutically equivalent under the Food andDrug Administration’s
(FDA’s) definition, the main active ingredients must be the same, as well as the dosage
form, route of administration, and strength.12 Drug companies compete with drugs far
beyond drugs that mirror each of these parameters. Thus, equivalence provides only a
limited viewofmarket competition.Other drug classification systems fail to capture the
full competitive picture, particularly with drugs that are marketed for off-label uses.13
Drug companies undoubtedly know which drugs compete with their own, even if
those drugs only compete off-label or in certain subsections of themarket. The concept
11 See Charles Ornstein & Katie Thomas, Take the Generic, Patients Are Told. Until They Are Not, NY Times
(Aug. 6, 2017) (interviewing one patient whose health plan required an additional $50 permonth for using
the generic version of the attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) drug, Adderall, rather than
the brand, and another whose plan did not cover the generic at all, only the brand), https://www.nytime
s.com/2017/08/06/health/prescription-drugs-brand-name-generic.html (accessed Oct. 30, 2020); see
also id. (describing communication to pharmacists at the end of 2016 that someMedicare prescription drug
plans with formularies designed by a major PBM would cover only the brand-name version of 12 drugs,
some of which had generic competitors); see also Complaint at 2,Grabstald v Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc.,
No. 17–05789 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 9, 2017) (alleging that pharmacies charged patients more for certain generics
that the patients would have paid without insurance or if they had paid cash); see also Complaint at 1, Pfizer
Inc. v Johnson & Johnson and Janssen Biotech, Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31690, No. 17–4180 (E.D. Pa. 2018)
(alleging that hospitals and health plans essentially excluded the lower-priced biosimilar version of the
rheumatoid arthritis drug, Remicade); see also Complaint at 6, 21–23, Shire U.S. Inc. v Allergan, Inc., No.
17–7716 (D.N.J. 2017) (alleging bundled-rebate scheme by a pharmaceutical company to induce health
plans to exclude or disadvantage the dry eye medication, Restasis).
12 See Drugs@FDA Glossary of Terms, U. S Food and Drug Administration, https://www.fda.gov/dru
gs/drug-approvals-and-databases/drugsfda-glossary-terms (accessed Dec. 16, 2019).
13 For example, in the World Health Organization’s complex, five-level Anatomical-Therapeutic-Chemical
(ATC) classification system, drugs are characterized according to themain therapeutic use or pharmacolog-
ical class according to the principle of only one ATC code for each route of administration. See Structure
and Principles, WHO Collaborating Ctr. for Drug Stats. Methodology, https://www.whocc.
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of ‘therapeutic competitors’ encompasses this broader range of market dynamics. As
described below,14 this study examines a subset of therapeutic competitors defined
as drugs containing the same active ingredient. Within this framework, the study
quantitatively examines certain instances of irrational tiering in the formulary system—
specifically, instances inwhich twoormore drugswith the same active ingredient (such
as a brand and a generic) are improperly placed on the same tier or when the cheaper
drug is placed on a more-expensive tier.
The results are striking, but empirical results are of little use to society if they simply
set off rounds of finger-pointing—an activity that has been rampant in Washington
DC since the nation has focused its attention on drug pricing. Drug companies blame
both health insurers andmiddle players known as pharmacy benefitmanagers (PBMs);
PBMs blame drug companies; and so on.15 Finger-pointing exercises, however, are
rarely productive (except perhaps in piano practice). And as academic literature sug-
gests, there is plenty of blame to go around.16 To varying degrees, many players are
profiting on the backs of patients and the government. These players are, after all,
profit-making entities, and they are likely to respond to the incentives created by the
system. Thus, at the end of the day, finger-pointing merely distracts from the task
at hand: creating a better legal framework that more successfully aligns public and
private incentives. And in a free-market system, those incentives necessarily include
encouraging the competitive forces that erode monopoly positions and bring prices to
competitive levels.
Price, of course, is amurky term in the world of prescription drugs. Drug companies
point out—and rightfully so—that headline-grabbing list prices do not necessarily
reflect the price of an individual drug purchase.17 Rather, the actual price of an indi-
vidual drug purchase can only be determined after subtracting rebate amounts, which
themselves will be determined long after the patient has left the drug counter. Those
rebates will be calculated based on complex formulas established in contracts between
14 See infra text accompanying notes 123–127.
15 See, eg, Eric Sagonowsky, Bring it on, Pharma: Finger-Pointing at Insurers Provokes AHIP Tweetstorm, Fier-
cePharma (Sept. 28, 2017), www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/insurance-lobby-phrma-duke-it-out-over-
healthcare-costs. See, eg, Berkeley Lovelace Jr. & Ashley Turner,CVS, Cigna, Humana Blame Big Pharma at
Senate Hearing for Skyrocketing US Drug Prices, CNBC (Apr. 9, 2019). (‘A major factor contributing to the
increase in drug spending is the list price of prescription drugs. Drug manufacturers alone set the list price
of prescription drugs’, saidWilliamFleming, President ofHealth-Care Services atHumana). See also Philip
Moeller, Drug Companies Try Shifting Blame for High Prices Under Lawmakers’ Scrutiny, Public Broad-
casting Service, (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/making-sense/column-
drug-companies-try-shifting-blame-for-high-prices-under-lawmakers-scrutiny (showingdrug companies
directingblameatPBMs for their role in increasingdrugprices); see alsoShira Stein, Insurers to Disclose Drug
Copays, Treatment Terms Under Proposal, Bloomberg Law (Nov. 15, 2019) https://news.bloomberglaw.
com/health-law-and-business/insurers-to-disclose-drug-copays-treatment-terms-under-proposal.
16 Feldman, supra note 6. See generally Steven Brill,America’s Bitter Pill: Money, Politics, Backroom Deals, and
the Fight to Fix Our Healthcare System (2015) (explaining how hospitals can play a role in increasing prices
for consumers even for standard care).
17 SeeNeeraj Sood,Understanding Competition in Prescription Drug Markets: Entry and Supply Chain Dynamics,
Fed. Trade Comm’n Workshop Slides 105, 107 (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docume
nts/public_events/1255653/understanding_competition_in_prescription_drug_markets_workshop_
slides_11-8-17.pdf (accessed Oct. 30, 2020) (noting that Jenny Bryan, Senior Vice President at PhRMA,










ollege of the Law
 user on 17 August 2021
6 • The devil in the tiers
drug companies and middle players known as PBMs.18 Drug companies and PBMs
assert that the pricing information is a trade secret, with the result that health plans,
and even plan auditors, are not allowed to know the full terms of the contracts or the
net price of drugs.19 In otherwords, true net price is a slippery term that is disassociated
from key buying moments and decisions.20
An unruly problem demands a disruptive solution, and therein lies the startling
recommendation that emerges from this work. ‘One actually need not know the true
net price.’ Rather, one can restore sanity to drug pricing without the parties actually
knowing the true price. To repeat for emphasis, one can fix price without knowing the
price, at least in the context described in this article. To accomplish this feat of magic,
tiering should be based on list price. Yes, list price—that badly maligned, roundly
dismissed figure—should become the touchstone.
Focusing on list price eliminates the need to ferret out and decipher complex deals.
It also avoids the practical problem of navigating around the parties’ claims that trade
secret lawprotects net price information.21 Further, focusingon list price is grounded in
the reality that many patients payment do reflect the list price, either because (i) they
must pay the full list price before reaching a deductible, (ii) they lack complete drug
coverage or any drug coverage at all, or 3) their co-sharing payment is determined as a
percentage of the list price.22
Using list price also has the happy side effect of disincentivizing the rebate andquasi-
kickback games that drug companies use and middle players demand. Those games
are like raising the price of a jacket before a sale, so the sale price looks appealing.23
Unfortunately, many people end up paying the pre-sale price for the jacket—and, of
course, many people pay the full price for drugs.24 Worse yet, as this study demon-
strates, drug prices are rising at a faster pace than rebates, with the result that the rebates
only begin to offset the substantial increases.25 Finally, rebate games create bloated
spending (because middle players pocket the spread) and harm competition (because
drug companies provide rebates so that cheaper competitors are disadvantaged).
18 See Michael Hiltzik, How ‘Price-Cutting’ Middlemen are Making Crucial Drugs Vastly More Expensive, LA
Times (2017), https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-pbm-drugs-20170611-story.html
(accessed Oct. 30, 2020) (noting that size of rebates are guarded as trade secrets in contracts).
19 Robin Feldman&Charles Tait Graves,Naked Price and Pharmaceutical Trade Secret Overreach, 22 Yale J.L.
& Tech. 61, 74 (2020) (noting that industry claims that naked price constitutes protectable trade secrets
de secret law).
20 Id. at 72.
21 Id. at 74.
22 See Feldman, supra note 6.
23 See Mark Meador, Squeezing the Middleman: Ending the Underhanded Dealing in the Pharmaceutical Benefit
Management Industry through Regulation, 20 Ann.HealthL. 77, 82 (2011) (noting that PBMs take advan-
tage of the price range in various price lists for generic drugs, negotiating with manufacturers for a lower
price and setting reimbursement rates with plan sponsors using a higher list price, tomaximize the spread);
cf . Fiona Scott Morton & Lysle T. Boller, Enabling Competition in the Pharmaceutical Markets, Working
Paper 30, Hutchings Ctr. on Fiscal & Monetary Pol’y (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/wp30_scottmorton_competitioninpharma1.pdf (accessed Oct. 30, 2020).
24 SeeMedPACReport, supra note 2;NormanAugustine, GuruMadhavan&SharylNass,Making Medicines
Affordable: A National Imperative, Nat’l Academies of Sci., Eng’g, and Med. 76 (2018) (hereinafter
NAS Report).
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Despite widespread recognition of the problem, complex legislative and regulatory
attempts to reform this practice have failed.26 In contrast, a simple, Congressional or
regulatory mandate that government programs use list prices for tiering would sweep
aside the incentives for playing the rebate game. Back-room negotiations and tempting
rebate payments would not matter. The price is the price.
Although there is no silver bullet, and all approaches have challenges, basing tiering
on list price is a remarkably streamlined approach for cutting through a wide swath of
perverse incentives andmanipulations. After all, at the end of the day, it is the price that
matters.
II. FORMULARIES, DRUGS, AND PRICES: AN OVERVIEW OF
THE HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
II.A. A Brief History of Formularies
Formularies, at the most basic level, are a list of medicines. Formularies for hospitals
have existed in the USA since the days of the American Revolution when the Lititz
Pharmacopeia was published in 1778 for use by the Continental forces.27 It was not
until 1816, however, that a formulary for a private civilian hospital was compiled,
which was called the Pharmacopeia of the New York Hospital.28 Four years later, the first
national pharmacopeia in the USA was published, with the objective of ‘select [ing]
from among substances which possess medicinal power, those, the utility of which
is most fully established and best understood’.29 It is unclear when the transition of
terminology from ‘pharmacopeia’ to ‘formulary’ occurred in the USA.30 Historians
document, however, that the idea of a formulary as a simple clinical management tool
was established in the USA early on in its history.
FollowingWorldWar II, formularies expandedbeyond the roleofmerely identifying
clinical sufficiency and entered the realm of supply and inventory management. The
immense scale and sophistication of the penicillin development effort during the war
marked a new era for the pharmaceutical industry’s approach to developing drugs,
26 Eg 84 FR 2340 (Proposed Jan. 31, 2019; rejected July 10, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R 1001); See
Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: How Big Pharma Raises Prices and Keeps
Generics Off the Market (2017); see also David Brady & Daniel Kessler, Why is Health Reform so
Difficult?, 35 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & Law (2010); See also Anders Asland,Opinion: US Health care is an
Ongoing Miserable Failure,The Hill (Jan. 5, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/healthcare/423865-us-
health-care-is-an-ongoing-miserable-failure.
27 DonaldE. Francke,Clifton J. Latiolais,GloriaN.Francke&NormanHo,The Formulary System: Brief History
and 1960s Perspective: Excerpted from Mirror to Hospital Pharmacy, 43 Am. J. Hosp. Pharmacy 2838, 2838
(1986).
28 Id.
29 Malcolm J. Pearce & Evan J. Begg, A Review of Limited Lists and Formularies, 1 PharmacoEconomics
191, 192 (1992) [citing United States Pharmacopoeia Convention Inc., History of the Phar-
macopeia of the United States xli-xliii (21st ed. 1984)].
30 Id. The transition may have occurred in 1936, when ‘pharmacy and therapeutic committees (P&T) were
first established in American Hospitals to consider all matters related to the use of drugs in hospitals. Such
committees became an integral part of the formation and management of hospital formularies’. P&T are
responsible for managing the formulary system and are composed of active healthcare providers including
nurses, doctors, andpharmacists.Theymanage formularieswith the intent to improve safetyof drug therapy
and therapeutic outcomes, among other clinical concerns. Linda S. Tyler et al., ASHP Guidelines on the
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ushering inunprecedented levels of newdevelopment andmassproduction.31 Asmany
more medications became available to treat a range of diseases, hospitals began to use
formularies for managing and controlling their drug inventory and supply needs.32
Formularies edged closer to government regulation in 1965. In that year, the private,
nonprofit organization for evaluating hospitals—now, known as The Joint Commis-
sion—began requiring that hospitals maintain an active Pharmacy and Therapeutics
Committee that would communicate on drug-use issues.33 At this point, formularies
were recognized as a useful tool for hospitals, rather than a broad tool for all health
insurers, and governmental agencies had yet to apply formal, widespread regulation.
The first, widespread, formal government regulation of formularies—outside of
episodes such as military use in the American Revolution—occurred with the passage
of the Social Security Amendments of 1965. In addition to having an impact on drug
development, the period following World War II saw changing attitudes about federal
administration of the Social Security Program.34 Prior to that time, states were viewed
as the preferred administrators of health insurance and other forms of social insurance.
Following World War II, the view shifted entirely, and states were viewed as unreliable
and inefficient administrators of social welfare programs, who, by handling the same
social problems in highly disparate ways, created chaos rather than coherence.35
As a practical matter, states were already too embedded in the welfare system to
be swept aside.36 Thus, when the Social Security Amendments of 1965 created the
Medicare and Medicaid Programs, the Amendments established Medicaid as a joint
effort between the federal and state governments to provide basic hospital insurance
for the poor.37 The same legislation established Medicare, designed to provide basic
hospital insurance for the elderly, as a program administered by the Federal Govern-
ment.38 Thus, 1965 marked the beginning of formal, federal government regulation of
formularies, but only in their capacity as a useful tool for hospitals.
In the 1970s, formularies evolved beyond hospital use to become an essential cost
control tool for health insurers in the outpatient realm. Unexpectedly high Medicare
expenditures, rapid inflation, expansion of hospital expenses and profits, and changes
in medical care contributed to the escalating healthcare costs in the 1970s.39 The
increasing healthcare costs drove a paradigm shift in health insurance, away from
31 Robin Walsh, A History of the Pharmaceutical Industry, Pharmaphorum (Oct. 1, 2010), https://pharma
phorum.com/articles/a_history_of_the_pharmaceutical_industry/.
32 See Robert B. Goldberg, Managing the Pharmacy Benefit: The Formulary System, 3 J. Managed Care
Pharmacy & Spec. Pharmacy 565, 565 (1997).
33 SeeTyler et al., supra note 30, at 1275. The Joint Commission is a nonprofit organization that certifiesmore
than 22,000US healthcare organizations and programs.About Us, The JointCommission, https://www.
jointcommission.org/about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx (accessed Nov. 15, 2019).
34 EdwardBerkowitz,Medicare and Medicaid: The Past as Prologue, 27HealthCareFin. Rev. 11, 14 (2005).
35 Id. [citing Arthur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social Security (1966)].
36 Berkowitz, supra note 34, at 14.
37 See Gary Smith et al., Office of the Assistant Sec’y for Planning & Evaluation, U.S. Dep’t.
of Health & Human Servs., Using Medicaid to Support Working Age Adults with Serious
Mental Illnesses in theCommunity: AHandbook 19 (2005). See also Social Security Amendments
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965).
38 See Smith et al., supra note 37.
39 See Healthcare Crisis: Healthcare Timeline, Public Broadcasting Service, https://www.pbs.org/hea
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fee-for-service reimbursement and toward amanaged care environment.40 Enrollment
in managed care organizations surged, and insurers began to look for ways to control
costs, including the prescription drug benefit.41 Most health plans already had experi-
ence with hospital formularies, and insurers initially considered using formularies that
took a unified approach to medications for inpatient and outpatient care.42 The cost
of medication varied tremendously, however, between hospital pharmacies and com-
munity pharmacies, even for the same drug.43 Insurers, therefore, needed a separate
outpatient formulary.
As formularies entered into widespread use for cost control, however, they had
yet to expand into the final, key role for today’s modern formulary: a tool for drug
selection and rebate negotiations with drug manufacturers. This final step would fall
into place through a combination of the 1980s Hatch–Waxman Act (for the rapid
approval of generic drugs)44 and the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (offering
prescription drug benefits to all Medicare beneficiaries).45 Hatch–Waxman created
a wave of generics entering the market, including multiple generic versions of some
medications.46 With the influx of competing drugs, brand companies began offering
rebates to health insurers, in exchange for preferred placement on formularies.47
In the Medicare Modernization Act, Congress expanded Medicare to include
widespread coverage of drugs that patients purchased at a retail pharmacy, as opposed
to those related to hospital stays.48 Just asHatch–Waxmanbrought awave of additional
40 Goldberg, supra note 32, at 565. Fee-for-service health insurance allows patients to choose whatever
provider and health service they would like. Patients pay for everything out of pocket and then file the
paperwork for reimbursement with their insurers; this makes fee-for-service generally the most expensive
(and least common) insurance offered today. In contrast, managed-care health insurance limits coverage to
providers and hospitals in the insurer’s network (‘in-network’). In doing so, costs are decreased in general,
and the savings are passed to the patient in the formof lower deductibles, premiums, and copays. See Jeremy
Vohwinkle, Types of Individual Health Insurance Policies: HMOs, PPOs, and FFS, The Balance (Aug. 28,
2019), https://www.thebalance.com/health-insurance-ppo-s-hmo-s-1289671.
41 Goldberg, supra note 32, at 565–66.
42 Goldberg, supra note 32, at 566.
43 Id.
44 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
45 SeeMedicare PrescriptionDrug, Improvement, andModernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–173, 117
Stat. 2067 (2003).
46 SeeColeWerble,Health Policy Brief: Formularies, HealthAffairs (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.healtha
ffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20171409.000177/full/ (stating that ‘the emergence of formularies in the late
1980s was driven by a structural change in the drug industry—the development of several multibrand cate-
gories in which up to a half-dozen related, but not interchangeable, brands existed, with each commanding
a similar price’.)
47 See id. (stating ‘formularies gained prominence as a tool for purchasers to use in selecting among these
treatment options, with purchasers often obtaining rebates from drug manufacturers in exchange for
preferred formulary placement’.).
48 See Thomas R. Oliver, Philip R. Lee & Helene L. Lipton, A Political History of Medicare and Prescription
Drug Coverage, 82 Milbank Q. 283, 305 (2004) [citing Mary A. Laschober, Michelle Kitchman, Patricia
Neuman & Allison A. Strabic, Trends in Medicare Supplemental Insurance and Prescription Drug Coverage,
1996-1999, Health Aff. (Feb. 27, 2002)] (stating that ‘in 1999, . . . millions of [Medicare] beneficiaries
[were left] to shop elsewhere for prescription drug benefits—if they could afford them’). The Medicare
Modernization Act also led to increased government control of formularies in the context of health plans
that provide prescription drug coverage within the Medicare system. Following full implementation of the
Act in 2006, the federal agency charged with managingMedicare, the CMS, developed additional rules for
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competing drugs, the Medicare Modernization Act brought a wave of additional
patients who had insurance coverage for day-to-day prescription medications. Thus,
throughout the early 21st century, the modern formulary system evolved into a tool
that health insurers used, not just for cost control but also for drug selection and as
leverage with manufacturers to obtain rebates.
Implementation of the Medicare Modernization Act also transformed the rising
PBM industry in healthcare. PBMs originated in the 1970s, emerging largely as claims
processors.49 The industry changed in the 1990s, with the advent of electronic claims.
That shift, however, was minor in comparison to the tectonic shift that occurred as the
Medicare Modernization Act became fully implemented in 2006.50 With the influx of
new patients having prescription drug coverage, PBMs took on a new responsibility
for their clients, the insurers: negotiating rebates with drug manufacturers, as well as
helping design and manage formularies. This final, historic shift led to the modern
formulary as a drug choice tool for health insurance plans with the dual goals of clinical
effectiveness and cost control. In the words of one PBM executive, tiering is designed
to ‘encourage desirable outcomes while saving considerable costs . . . .Treatment—not
just prescribing—becomes better and more cost-effective. Ultimately, overall health
care improves’.
II.B. The Modern Formulary
Themajority of patients in theUSA rely on a health insurance plan to cover at least part
of their prescription drug cost. As described above, the core of this system is a plan’s
drug formulary, which determines both which drugs will be covered by insurance and
how much customers will pay through the plan.51 In the modern context, formularies
also function as a way of translating complicated pricing information into relatively
easily understood, out-of-pocket costs for individual insurance plan subscribers.
Insurance companies create formularies to differentiate preferred and nonpreferred
drugs by using a multi-tier system. When a drug is on the lowest tier—tier one—
patients who buy the drug have lower cost-sharing burdens; when drugs are on higher
tiers, patients pay more. A patient’s payment can come in the form of a flat copay, a
percentage of the cost of the drug (which is known as co-insurance), or a combination
of both.52 Thus, when drugs are on the same tier, patients will have the same copay
including that a P&T ‘will approve inclusion or exclusion of the therapeutic classes in the formulary on
an annual basis’. See Ctrs. forMedicare &Medicaid Servs., Medicare Modernization Act 2007
FinalGuidelines—Formularies 2 (2007) (hereinafterMMAFinalGuidelinesonFormularies);
42C.F.R.§ 423.120(b)(1).Together, the legislation and the regulations laid the groundwork for themodern
formulary in theMedicare system, also providing pathways for reforms.
49 Allison Dabbs Garrett & Robert Garis, Leveling the Playing Field in the Pharmacy Benefit Management
Industry, 42 Val. U. L. Rev. 33, 34 (2007).
50 RobinFeldman,Why Prescription Drug Prices Have Skyrocketed,Wash.Post (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/26/why-prescription-drug-prices-have-skyrocketed/.
51 Werble, supra note 46.
52 Kaiser Family Found., 2017 Employer Health Benefits Survey 98 (2017) (hereinafter 2017
EmployerHealthBenefits Survey) (explaining the difference between various employee cost-sharing
structures including coinsurance and copayment), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Employer-Hea










ollege of the Law
 user on 17 August 2021
The devil in the tiers • 11
Tier 1 The prescription drug tier that consists of the lowest-cost tier
of prescription drugs: most are generic.
Tier 2 The prescription drug tier that consists of medium-cost
prescription drugs: most are generic and some brand-name
prescription drugs.
Tier 3 The prescription drug tier that consists of high-cost
prescription drugs: most are brand-name prescription drugs.
Tier 4 The prescription drug tier that consists of the higher-cost
prescription drugs: most are brand-name prescription drugs
and some specialty drugs.
Tier 5 The prescription drug tier that consists of the highest-cost
prescription drugs: most are specialty drugs.
amount, regardless of the drug’s wholesale price. Any co-insurance amount, however,
could vary.
The following is an example of a five-tier formulary, provided by a BlueShield health
plan, which is typical of five-tier formularies:53
Although specialty drugs are normally placed on nonpreferred tiers, the definition
of a specialty drug can vary among plans and within literature. Medicare sets a floor
(at least $670 per month in 2019) to define a drug as ‘specialty’.54 Beyond Medicare
and in general, high list prices tend to distinguish specialty drugs from other drugs,
along with four corollary features: treating rare conditions, requiring special handling,
using a limited distribution network, or necessitating ongoing clinical assessment and
monitoring.55
An insurance plan will normally cover only the drugs listed on its formulary tiers.
For all other (nonlisted) drugs, patients will have to pay the full price out of their own
pockets.56
Onecan thinkof tiering as loosely analogous toproductplacement in a grocery store.
A company will sell more of its soda cans if the cans are placed on the end-cap display
of a grocery aisle than on the top shelf of the drinks section. Thus, to the extent tier
placement is intended to incentivize the purchase of drugs that the health plan prefers,
the plan is placing the drugs certain drugs on the end cap. The term ‘loosely analogous’
is used because patients cannot decide what prescription medicine to purchase alone.
The doctor’s prescription drives the purchase, and both patient and doctor may suffer
53 See Copayment Tier Definitions, supra note 10.
54 Juliette Cubanski, Wyatt Koma & Tricia Neuman, The Out of Pocket Cost Burden for Specialty Drugs in
Medicare Part D in 2019, Kaiser Family Foundation (Feb. 1, 2019) https://www.kff.org/medicare/i
ssue-brief/the-out-of-pocket-cost-burden-for-specialty-drugs-in-medicare-part-d-in-2019/.
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from insufficient information to make pricing-based choices. Thus, being on the ‘end-
cap’ of the prescription drug-pricing tier is not a perfect incentivizing mechanism.
Nevertheless, the tiering system is designed to drive choices in the market, however
imperfectly that market operates.
Inmodern formularies, oneof themost important factors for tier placement involves
deals between PBMs and drug manufacturers. As described above, PBMs are the
middle players who negotiate with drug companies on behalf of health plans and help
the plans create their formularies.57 PBMs that can promise drug companies a certain
amount of revenue (ie sales volume) from a particular health plan can obtain sizable
rebates off the list price for a particular drug. In theory, the PBM’s ability to negotiate
with drug companies should lead to lower prices for prescription drugs, ultimately
improving consumer welfare for individuals.58
In short, the modern formulary theoretically serves not only as a tool for ensuring
that drugs are clinically effective, it also helps to control the cost of prescription
medication, minimizing health plan spending and patient out-of-pocket costs. This is
accomplished through a combination of prioritizing generics over brand drugs and
preferred brands over nonpreferred brands. Price, however, is a slippery term in the
modern world of pharmaceuticals.
II.C. The Price of a Drug
The strange and shrouded notion of price in the pharmaceutical industry begins in
a perfectly ordinary fashion. Drug companies sell their product to wholesalers. The
price of a drug, however, will quickly dissolve into a tangle of timing oddities, rebates,
and an impressively obscure alphabet soup of terms used in the industry—wholesale
acquisition cost (WAC),59 maximum allowable cost (MAC),60 average wholesale
price (AWP),61 average sales price (ASP),62 estimated acquisition cost (EAC),63 and
others—many of which lack a consistent definition, are unverified, or are not based
on actual sales transactions. Despite all of this, drug price begins with drug companies
selling their products to wholesalers; that basic price is already reported to the federal
government. The figure, whichmust be based on actual sales, is statutorily defined and
57 See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
58 See generally Feldman, supra note 6 (describing perverse incentives in the PBM rebate system).
59 Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t. of Health & HUM. Servs., Medicaid Drug Price Com-
parisons: AverageManufacturer Price to Published Prices I (2005) (hereinafterHHSReport)
(noting thatWAC is an estimate of the pharmacy’s acquisition cost through commercially available reports).
60 Id. at 2 (defining MAC as the upper limit that state Medicaid programs will reimburse pharmacies for
selected drugs).
61 Id. at 2 (explaining that AWP ‘is often considered a price for wholesalers to charge retailers’ and is based off
of commercially available reports).
62 Id. at 3 (explaining that ASP is used by Medicare to determine reimbursement for drugs covered under
Medicare Part B).
63 Id. at 2 (noting EAC is the ‘best’ estimate of the cost providers paid for the drug). EAC is the benchmark
determining how much state Medicaid programs will reimburse pharmacies for their drugs (in addition to
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reported to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).64 For simplicity,
this paper will refer to this critical figure as the wholesale price of the drug.
Various other indexes are available as a measure of wholesale price, although each
one is flawed. For example, drug companies voluntarily supply reports to third-party
commercial services that, in theory, report the price at which the companies sell to
wholesalers.65 Drug-makers also voluntarily provide the average of that cost to the
third-party commercial services.66 Both sets of figures are unverified, and the Health
and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General has reported that those
numbers are not necessarily based on actual sales.67
In theory, the patient would pay the wholesale price with a small markup for the
wholesaler’s profit—in other words, the ‘list price’. In many circumstances, however,
the list price is only the beginning. Drug companies offer substantial rebates to health
plans, generally in recognition of the volume of product that the health plan’s patients
will purchase.
This critical juncture is where the system begins to go off the rails. As noted above,
middle players, known as PBMs negotiate prices on behalf of their health plan clients.
The health plans pay PBMs based on the size of the discount that the PBM can wrestle
from the drug company, sometimes even allowing the PBMs to pocket part of the
spread.68 This method—called spread pricing69— should lead PBMs to negotiate
more substantial discounts, which would, in turn, lower net prices. After all, one would
negotiate hard for discounts if one’s pay were determined by the size of that discount.
Perverse incentives and strategic behaviors, however, have derailed the process. To
increase the spread and profitability for the PBMs, drug companies can raise the list
pricesof their drugs and thenoffer steeper rebates.As a result, PBMscan report a greater
spread, thereby increasing their pay, even if net price remains the same or increases.70
64 HHSReport, supra note 59, at 4 [defining averagemanufacturer price (AMP) as the ‘average price paid by
wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail class of trade, net of customary prompt pay discounts’]. The
definition of AMP has changed under the ACA (and implemented by a CMS final rule in 2012, effective on
Apr. 1, 2016). The previous definition defined it as the average price paid to a manufacturer by a pharmacy
class of trade, which included mail order pharmacies and specialty pharmacies. Nontraditional pharma-
cies generally purchase drugs at higher costs, which means there is a lower rebate for Medicaid (when
Medicaid reimburses the pharmacies and the rebates go to Medicaid). The change excluded mail order
and specialty pharmacies from the definition of ‘pharmacy class of trade’ increasing rebates to Medicaid.
See Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t. of U.S. Health & Human Servs., Average Manufacturer
Price Determinations by Selected DrugManufacturers Generally Were ConsistentWith
Federal Requirements i–ii (2014).
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-3aI(6)(B) (definingWAC as ‘the manufacturer’s list price for the drug or biological
to wholesalers or direct purchasers in the USA, not including prompt pay or other discounts, rebates,
or reductions in price, for the most recent month for which the information is available, as reported in
wholesale price guides or other publications of drug or biological pricing data’). Within the alphabet soup
of listings, this figure is charmingly namedWAC for ‘Wholesale Acquisition Cost’.
66 Commercial publishers of AWP data include Truven Health Analytics, Red Book, Medi-Span, and First
Databank. AWP technically stands for ‘Average Wholesale Price’ and is colloquially referred to as ‘Ain’t
What’s Paid’.
67 See HHS Report, supra note 59.
68 For an extensive examination of the rebate system and its effects on competition, see Feldman, supra note
6.
69 See generallyChristy A. Rentmeester&Robert I. Garis,Rebates and Spreads: Pharmacy Benefit Management
Practices and Corporate Citizenship, 33 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 943, 948–50, (2008).
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This creates upward pressure on drug prices, as drug companies offer—and PBMs
demand—greater and greater spreads.
The spread pricing and rebate system might be less of a problem if no one actually
paid the higher price but many people do. Some health plans require that patients pay
the full amount for a drug until reaching a deductible level.71 The full amount is the list
price and ignores all rebates. Other plans require that patients pay a co-share amount
based on a percentage of the full list price.72 Some patients lack health insurance or lack
plans that cover medications.73 Even when full Medicare coverage is in place, gaps can
occur that leave patients paying the full cost of the drug.74 Most importantly, prices are
rising faster than rebates.75 Thus, for those who do not pay the full list price, the cost of
drugs is increasing at an alarming rate, even with rebates.
The timing of rebates completely obscures the actual price of any individual drug
transaction. When a patient goes to the pharmacy to purchase a prescription drug,
the price includes the list price—that is, the wholesale price with markup for the
wholesaler’s profit—plus a small markup for the pharmacists. To cover that cost,
the pharmacist collects the patient’s copay or co-insurance amount, along with the
insurance plan’s contribution (generally processed by the PBM).76 Rebates arrive long
after the patient has left the pharmacy counter. A health plan’s PBMwill provide rebates
to the health plan that cover a large number of drug transactions and likely a large
number of drugs. Thus, for example, a health plan knows what it paid for a particular
patient’s heart medication at the point of the sale—and what it paid overall for all
transactions. Nevertheless, the plan never knows the true net price, because the rebate
on that purchase will be lumpedwith rebates formany other transactions and delivered
long after the patient has left the pharmacy counter.
Timing and aggregation are not the only issues obscuring net prices. After all, a
plan could simply disaggregate those prices to obtain net prices, at least some time
down the road. The rebate amounts, however, normally flow from long and complex
calculations that are set out in contracts between the PBM and the drug company.
Drug companies and PBMs claim that net prices, and the calculations that produce
thosenet prices, are trade secrets. Although courts havenot squarely addressedwhether
that information constitutes a trade secret77 and academics have cast doubt on the
claim,78 the information is fiercely guarded, even from the PBMs’ own client, the
health plan. The health plan’s auditors are not even allowed full access to the terms.79
71 For example, 30% of all employer-sponsored health insurance plans are structured in this manner. SeeNAS
Report, supra note 24.
72 SeeMedPAC Report, supra note 2, at 408–9.
73 See Stacie B. Dusetzina & Peter B. Bach, Prescription Drugs—List Price, Net Price, and the Rebate Caught in
the Middle, 321 JAMA 1563, 1563 (2019) (noting that those without insurance pay the full list price).
74 SeeMedPac Report, supra note 2, at 404.
75 See infra Figure 1.
76 For a description of a practice known as clawbacks, in which PBMs collect more from the pharmacist
than the health plan’s contribution, creating the potential for the pharmacist to lose money on the sale,
see Feldman, supra note 6, at 49–50.
77 See Feldman &Graves, supra note 19.
78 See Feldman &Graves, supra note 19; see also Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices:
How Medical Device Manufacturers are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17Tex. Intell. Prop.
L.J. 187 (2009).
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As a result, actual net prices are hidden—from the patient, from the health plan,
from government regulators, and from pesky academics. Lack of information makes
it difficult for government regulators to ferret out inappropriate behavior—or reform
the process—and for patients to make fully informed decisions about drug purchases
and health plan purchases.
Moreover, the PBM industry is highly concentrated, with three PBMs controlling
85% of the market.80 Given the market structure, PBMs reportedly engage in lockstep
demands, making it difficult for health plans to bargain for different terms.81
The systembenefits drugmanufacturers aswell. In exchange for the lucrative rebates
that drive PBM profitability, drug manufacturers can demand that the PBM guarantee
a certain volume flow from the health plan’s patients by giving their drugs exclusive or
preferred formulary placement. These volume rebates allow drug companies that hold
a substantial position in the market to prevent new competitors from gaining ground.
In competition terms, one canconceptualize this as a formof raising rivals’ costs, that
is, engaging in a behavior that will impose costs on your competitor without imposing
similar costs on you.82 Imagine if Budweiser approached bar owners in a state offering
$1 off each bottle of Bud sold, if the owners agree not to put any craft beers on the
menu.83 If the bar owners normally sell two million bottles of Bud in a year, that offer
is worth $2 million. Now imagine a small craft beer company trying to break into the
market—an entrant that might start off by selling 10,000 bottles at $3 each. Even if the
new entrant discounted the price down to a single penny per bottle in comparison to
the normal $3 price, the bar owners would save only about $30,000. The new entrant
could never match Budweiser’s $2 million offer to the PBM. And remember, the PBM
will be paid based on the amount of the discount spread, and it may even be able to
pocket the spread.
The danger of volume rebates can be more pronounced in the context of large drug
manufacturers offering a variety of drugs. A drug company offering multiple drugs can
use itsmarketdominance inonedrug toprotect its less competitivedrug.Andof course,
branddrugswhosepatents are expiringmayholdmonopoly positions that allow for this
type of volume rebate behavior.84
Anecdotal evidence has hinted at abuses in the formulary system, driven by the
incentive structure in place and the type of strategic behaviors described above. One
lawsuit alleged that health insuranceplans essentially excluded a lower-priced versionof
80 See Feldman, supra note 6, at 14.
81 For an extendeddiscussionof thePBMmarket and its effect onprices, see Feldman, supranote 6, at 13–45.
82 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs To Achieve
Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209 (1986); see also Feldman, supra note 6, at 38 (comparing the strategy of
raising prices at the tail end of a monopoly period to ‘raising rivals’ costs’).
83 The beer example, along with a full discussion of the implications of volume rebating in the pharmaceutical
industry, was first presented by the author in Feldman, supra note 6, at 22. See also Robin Feldman,
Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 Geo. L.J. 2079 (1999) (hereinafter Defensive Leveraging) (discussing
volume rebates in the context of the cephalosporin market).
84 SeeDefensive Leveraging, supra note 83. For a discussion of the fact that holding a patent does not guarantee
a monopoly, see Robin Feldman, Rethinking Patent Law 65–67 (2012). For a discussion of how
increased costs from improper tiering might interact with the cost of health insurance premiums, see infra
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the arthritis drug Remicade, following bundled rebate deals from the brand.85 Another
alleged that a vaccine company significantly raised its prices for any consumers that
did not buy a certain number of its bundled drugs, in order to prevent customers from
jumping ship to a recently introduced competitor.86 Another alleged that a company
used bundled rebates and exclusive formulary contracts to disadvantage competitors
of the blockbuster dry eye medication, Restasis.87
Outside the lawsuit setting, press and individual reports have described patients
paradoxically paying a ‘higher’ co-share for filling their prescriptions with the generic
and a lower co-share for buying the brand.88 The press piece reported of pharmacists
being told in 2017 that some Medicare plans, with formularies designed by the same
PBM, would cover only the brand version of 12 drugs, despite the fact that some of the
drugs had generic competitors on the market.89 In the same vein, generics and con-
sulting industry sources have asserted that patients are being overcharged for generics
and that generics are being placed on irrational tiers, harming the generics industry and
inflating patient costs.90 These sources provide few details on the assertions, however.
Although academic research on tier placement is sparse, the literature suggests that
over the past decade, a number of players in the pharmaceutical industry have engaged
in strategic behavior related to tiering. One paper, for instance, found that insurers used
tiers as a way around the Affordable Care Act’s laws barring discrimination based upon
preexisting conditions.91 Patients who are human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) pos-
itive may have greater medical needs and higher-cost medications. By placing all HIV
85 Complaint at 1, Pfizer, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson and Janssen Biotech, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31690
(E.D. Pa. 2018) (No. 17–4180).
86 Class Action Complaint at 3, Castro, M.D., P.A. v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., LEXIS 96001 (D.N.J. 2012) (No.
11–7178).
87 See Complaint at 6, 21–23, Shire U.S., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., No. 17–7716 (D.N.J. 2017) (complaint alleging
that according to oneMedicare plan administrator, the new competitor could give its drug away for free and
the numbers still would not work).
88 SeeOrnstein&Thomas, supra note 11 (reporting on insurance plans that punished patients for filling their
prescriptionswith the generic version of attention-deficit, stroke prevention, pain-relieving, and cholesterol
drugs); see also Posting of Dr Rosemary Jane Jolly, rjj14@psu.edu, to l-new-faculty-net@lists.psu.edu
(Jan. 7, 2020) (faculty member at Pennsylvania State University, speaking from her experience on the
Faculty Senate and Faculty Advisory Committee to the President, explaining in an email to faculty that
the university’s employer-provided insurance plan was forcing faculty members to use brand drugs when
cheaper generics were available) (on file with author).
89 See Ornstein & Thomas, supra note 11.
90 See, eg, Letter from Marcie McClintic Coates, Head of Global Policy, Mylan, to Aaron Zajic, Office
of Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.regulations.
gov/document?D=HHSIG-2019-0001-19845 (hereinafter Letter from Mylan); see also Press Release,
Avalere Health, Seniors Pay More for Medicare Part D Generics Despite Stable Prices (May 22,
2018), https://avalere.com/press-releases/seniors-pay-more-for-generics-in-medicare-prescription-dru
g-plans-despite-stable-prices) (healthcare consulting firm press release asserting that due to improper
formulary placement, seniors in Medicare Part D overpay for generic drugs and that the 53% decrease in
the number of generic drugs placed on the lowest tier between 2011 and 2015 cost patients an additional
$6.2 billion in 2015—a 93% increase relative to 2011). https://avalere.com/press-releases/seniors-pay-
more-for-generics-in-medicare-prescription-drug-plans-despite-stable-prices (accessed Oct. 30, 2020).
91 Douglas Jacobs & Benjamin Sommers, Using Drugs to Discriminate—Adverse Selection in the Insurance










ollege of the Law
 user on 17 August 2021
The devil in the tiers • 17
drugs on the highest-cost tier, insurance companies discourage high-cost, HIV-positive
patients from enrolling.92
Researchers also have identified tiering behaviors designed to evade other aspects
of the Affordable Care Act, such as those related to the Essential Health Benefits
Provision.93 This provision requires that health insurersmust cover at least one drug in
each class and that all drugs must be covered in six protected classes. The provision
does not regulate related dimensions of formulary design, such as cost-sharing and
tier placement.94 As a result, insurers may comply with the Affordable Care Act while
also undermining the Act’s goals of expanding prescription drug access for patients by
manipulating tier placement. One econometric study, for example, found that while
insurers complied with the Affordable Care Act’s provisions to cover additional drugs,
compliance increased the probability that a newly covered drug was assigned to a
more-costly formulary tier.95
Along the same lines, protests alleging discrimination in tiering have been lodged
with state and federal regulatory agencies. For example, two groups filed an adminis-
trative complaint with the federal Department of Health and Human Services’ Office
for Civil Rights arguing that four insurers violated the Affordable Care Act’s nondis-
crimination provisions through adverse tiering on their plans in the federal health
exchange in Florida.96 The complaint settled, with the insurers agreeing to improve
the tier placement of HIVmedications, which would, in turn, make those medications
more affordable.97 In Georgia, letters from a state senator and a coalition of groups
successfully convinced the Georgia Department of Community Health to maintain
certain HIVmedications on the preferred tier of the state’s Medicaid formulary, rather
than downgrading them.98
92 Althoughnot related to inappropriate tier placement, other literature documents issues related to challenges
in providing mental health drugs for patients intrinsic to formulary design as well as concerns with
formularies in general. See, eg, Dominic Hodgkin, Cindy Parks Thomas, Linda Simoni-Wastila, Grant A.
Ritter & Sue Lee, The Effect of a Three-Tier Formulary on Antidepressant Utilization and Expenditures, 11 J.
Mental Health Pol’y & Econ. 67 (2008).
93 See, eg,MartinAndersen,Constraints on Formulary Design Under the Affordable Care Act, 26HealthEcon.
160 (2017).
94 45 C.F.R. § 156.122. See Govind Persad, Priority-Setting , Cost-Effectiveness, and the Affordable Care Act, 41
Am. J.L. &Med. 119 (2015).
95 See Andersen, supra note 93.
96 Although administrative complaints are treated as confidential by the HHS, one of the complaining
groups posted a copy on its website. See Jane Perkins and Wayne Turner, NHELP and The AIDS Institute
Complaint to HHS re HIV/AIDS Discrimination by FL, The Nat’l Health Law Program (May 28,
2014), https://healthlaw.org/resource/nhelp-and-the-aids-institute-complaint-to-hhs-re-hiv-aids-discri
mination-by-fl/; see also Katie Thomas, Bias Claims for Insurers in Coverage of HIV , N.Y. Times, (May
29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/business/four-insurers-accused-of-discriminating-a
gainst-people-with-hiv.html.
97 NatalieKean,Fighting Against Discriminatory Health Insurance Practices: Successful Advocacy in Florida, inU.S.
ConferenceonAIDS (Sept. 16, 2016), http://theaidsinstitute.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Kea
n%20-%20USCA%202016%20ACA%20Disc.pdf .
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Studies outside the academic realm report other types of concerns with formu-
laries and tiering. One investigative journalism piece, for example, found that when
pharmaceutical companies gave perks to doctors voting on Medicaid systems, those
doctors were more likely to recommend placement of the pharmaceuticals on state
formularies.99
In light of the many allegations, the study sets out to examine empirically whether
evidence exists of widespread irrational tiering—along with problems created by that
irrationality—and if so, how to address the problems. To do so, the study follows
roughly onemillionMedicare patients from 2006 to 2017, examining all of the cohort’s
drugpurchase claimsfiledduring this period.Thesedata are available for purchase from
the federal government through the CMS.100
Medicare provides a particularly useful pool of information for studying health
insurance tiering. The availability of detailed, government-verified claims data provides
an excellent basis for empirical research, particularly given that similar information on
private insurance plan patients is not available to researchers.101 Moreover, Medicare
has significant market presence and purchasing muscle, accounting for 29% of the
money spent on prescription drugs in the USA. Compared with an analysis of all
insurance plans with prescription drug coverage, however, there is presumably less
variation in a number of factors, including: the drugs the cohort buys, how the drugs
are covered by their insurance, the prices that they pay, the kind of rebates one expects
the plans to obtain, etc.102 Nevertheless, certain problems within theMedicare system
are likely to apply to the US health insurance system as a whole, making Medicare a
fertile research venue.Moreover, for reasons of political expediency discussed below, it
may be easier to craft initial reforms within theMedicare system.103
Developing a methodology to test the hypothesis was no easy task, given that
legislators, regulators, and researchers are caught in a bind. As noted above, drug
companies assert that drug prices constitute trade secrets. Thus, true price is shielded
even from health plans themselves—wrapped in layers of aggregated rebates, which
are paid long after any individual drug purchase takes place.104 Worse yet, there is no
consistent definition or list of brand versus generic drugs.105
99 Liz Whyte, Joe Yerardi & Alison Kodjak, Investigation: Patients’ Drug Options Under Medicaid
Heavily Influenced By Drugmakers, NPR, ( July 18, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2018/07/18/629575118/medicaid-under-the-influence-how-drugmakers-sway-medication-opti
ons-for-patients.
100 The study used Research Identifiable Files, meaning that files contain beneficiary level protected health
information. See Lori Siedelman, Differences between RIF, LDS, and PUF Data Files, Research Data
Assistance Ctr. (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.resdac.org/articles/differences-between-rif-lds-and-pu
f-data-files. Theworkwas reviewed and approved by the Institutional ReviewBoard in compliancewith the
requirements of the Common Rule and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
101 Feldman, supra note 6, at 92.
102 See infraAppendixA5 formoredetailed information about the requesteddata andcohort specifications. For
a discussion of differences betweenMedicare and private plans, see infra text accompanying notes 132–140.
103 See infra Section 4 for a detailed discussion of suggested reforms.
104 See supra notes 68–79 and accompanying text.
105 Comparing brand and generic drug placement on formulary tiers required categorizing all the drugs in the
data, representedwithNDC, as either brand or generic.Onewould assume that categorizing drugs as brand
or generic would be simple enough, but there are no hard and fast rules. There is no consistent, universal
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The study’s analysis breaks through thesebarriers to revealwhat is happeningbehind
the tiering curtain. A detailed methodology, including statistical significance testing,
will be made available to guide future researchers who wish to expand on or confirm
the results.106
The results of the study confirm that the manner in which drugs are currently
being placed on formulary tiers is adversely affecting patients and costing society. The
sections below will describe the results and analyses in detail, but key conclusions
include the following:
• From 2010 to 2017, the percentage of generics on the least-expensive tier drops
from 73% to 28%. The shift creates considerable burden for patients, given that the
average copay tripleswhenadrugmoves fromthefirst tier evenup to just the second
tier.
• During the same period, the percentage of drugs placed on inappropriate tiers in
relation to drugs with the same active ingredient increases from 47% to 74%.
• Considering only patient out-of-pocket costs and payments from the federal Low-
Income Subsidy program, abuses of the formulary system conservatively costs
$13.25 billion over the eight-year period, with the costs rising significantly from
the beginning to the end of the period.
• After factoring in rebates, the average dosage-unit price for brand drugs increases
by 313%, whereas the average dosage-unit price for generics remains stable.
III. STUDY DETAILS AND RESULTS
A few notes may be helpful at the outset. First, CMS began recording complete for-
mulary data in 2010.107 Thus, certain analyses cover only the eight-year period from
2010 to 2017, rather than the entire 12-year study period. In addition, although the
number of tiers in a health plan’s formulary can range from three to seven, the study
finds that plans with five tiers were the most common configuration within the data.
This finding is consistent with other reports.108 Thus, for the calculations related to
tiering, the study focuses on five-tier plans. Finally, although data on the rebates for
themethodology categorized drugs as brand or generic using three different sources in the following order:
the original CMS data, the National Library of Medicine’s RxNorm database, and finally, Cerner Multum’s
commercial drug database. The National Library of Medicine is a medical library and an institute within
the National Institutes of Health, operated by the federal government. RxNorm, NIH Nat’l Library of
Med., https://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/rxnorm/index.html (accessed Feb. 3, 2020). The study
also purchased access to a drug databasemanaged byCernerMultum, amedical information company. The
study used Cerner Multum’s database last to categorize drugs because it was not a governmental source.
Drug Database,Cerner, https://www.cerner.com/solutions/drug-database (accessed Nov. 15, 2019).
106 Center for Innovation, UC Hastings Law, https://www.uchastings.edu/academics/centers/center-for-i
nnovation/ (accessed Oct. 30, 2020). See Robin Feldman, Mark A. Lemley, Jonathan S. Masur, & Arti
K. Rai, Open Letter on Ethical Norms in Intellectual Property Scholarship, 29 Harv. J.L.&Tech. 339, 350–2
(2016) (with list of signatories).
107 See Data Dictionaries infra note 204; Part D Formulary File, Research Data Assistance Center
(accessed Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.resdac.org/cms-data/files/part-d-formulary-file.
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individual drugpurchases arenever available in any form, theMedicareTrusteesReport
provides average rebate data across all drugs for a particular year. That figure could be
used to derive the average rebates for brand drugmanufacturers, a calculation that is set
out in Appendix A2.
Before delving into an analysis of formulary tiering, the study begins by examining
the availability of drugs and the amounts that patients paid for their prescriptions,
to verify the commonly held assumption that the rising availability of generic drugs
leads to lower patient expenditures. This assumption lies behind modern initiatives
to increase the number of available generics as an antidote to concerns about rising
pharmaceutical prices and patient costs.109
An examination of the claims data finds that over the time period, an increasing
percentage of the drugs on formularies were, indeed, generics rather than brands.110 If
the formulary tier systemworks as hypothesized, patient expenditure should, therefore,
decrease. However, the study shows an entirely different picture. Patients, on average,
pay more for both brand and generic drugs between 2006 and 2017. In this 12-year
period, the average amount patients pay for brand drugs increases drastically, rising
from $18 to $47. Thus, a patient’s out-of-pocket payment for each brand drug more
than doubles during the 12 years of the study—and this is only for prescriptions that
were covered.Although the increase in averageprice paid is less stark, generic prices still
rise 75%, from$4 to $7.Given these results, the study finds that the growing prevalence
of generics has not prevented rising costs for consumers. In other words, from the
perspective of what a patient specifically pays out-of-pocket, more generic drugs alone
do not solve the problem of rapidly increasing drug prices.111
It is important to emphasize that these figures are for patient out-of-pocket costs.
During the same period, the net price of generic drugs stays roughly stable.112 One
would not expect the patient’s payment burden to rise 75% for generics when the
insurance plan’s cost of acquiring those drugs remains the same.
III.A. Broadening the Lens: Dosage-Unit Prices for Brands and Generics
The analyses above examine average patient out-of-pocket costs for brand and generic
drugs. To broaden the lens on drug prices, the study examines other aspects of drug
prices—not just those paid by the patient. Drugs can be dispensed in different dosages,
creating the need for a method of normalizing dosages and prices across different
drugs. To solve this problem, the study uses a novel metric: the average dosage-unit
price.
109 See, eg, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984). Informally known as the Hatch–Waxman Act, this Act incentivizes the rapid development and
entry of generic drugs once brand drug patents expire.
110 See infra Figure 6.
111 Expenditures for patients also include upfront premiums. See infra text accompanying notes 136–137 for a
discussion of the argument that rising drug costs are not harming patient premium payments.
112 See infra Figure 1 (showing that average dosage-unit price for generic drugs stays roughly stable). Generic
companies generally do not engage in rebating; the cost to the insurance company is the list price. See
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Figure 1. Average dosage-unit price.
Consider an analogy from the beer industry. Imagine a 12-pack of Bud Light cans
standing next to a single bottle of Heineken. To compare pricing between the two, one
wouldneed to consider the price of oneounceofBudLight in comparison tooneounce
of Heineken.
As described below, this novel metric also allows the study to examine the ever-
elusive category of prices after rebates. Specifically, the study finds that rebates are not
fully eliminating price increases. Rather, the price of brand drugs continues to rise at an
astonishing pace, even after factoring in rebates. Moreover, the cost of a brand drug far
exceeds the cost of a generic. After factoring in rebates,113 the average dosage-unit price
of brand drugs overwhelmingly exceeds that of generic drugs. In the discussion below,
the article uses the term, ‘net price’, to refer to the price after factoring in rebates.
As described above,114 net prices are important for understanding the true price
trajectory of a drug. If the list price of a drug rises, but the drug company discounts the
drug by the amount of the rise or more in the form of a rebate, it would be misleading
to suggest that the price has risen at all. With drug companies asserting that net price
information constitutes a trade secret—a secret so delicate that it cannot be revealed
even to the health plan itself—one cannot fully analyze drug prices.
This conundrum has stymied researchers and policymakers for years. Drug compa-
nies can defend against criticisms of rising drug prices by noting that prices are lower
than anyone realizes due to rebates—and then refuse to reveal any information about
the rebates. Any discussion of drug prices becomes a game of shadow boxing.
The study breaks this impasse. Using actual claims data and applying the method-
ology of dosage-unit price, the study shows that net prices climb dramatically between
2006 and 2017. As Figure 1 demonstrates, ‘after rebates’, the average dosage-unit prices
113 See 2011MedicareTrustees Report, supra note 112, at 183 (noting that generic drugs generally do not
provide rebates). For a discussion of the rebate methodology and calculations, see infra Appendix A5.
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for brand drugs experiences a shocking 313% increase across the decade. Specifically,
the average dosage-unit price of brand drugs after rebate increases from $38 to $157,
whereas generic drugs remain at a relatively stable $3–4.
One should note the following: The previous section found that the out-of-pocket
costs patients pay for generics rises 75% to roughly $7 per prescription across the
study period. This section finds that the average dosage-unit price ‘health insurers’
pay remains roughly stable. Thus, patient expenditures for generics are rising, whereas
insurers pay roughly the same amount for generics over time.
In short, although rebates rise over the decade, prices rise faster, outstripping the
effects of the rebates. Most important, the prices for brand drugs, both before and after
rebates, soar far above the price of generic drugs.
The net price, however, is not the only relevant figure; understanding the list price
is important for a different aspect of price trajectory. Quite simply, many people do pay
the full list price—at least at certain times—and others have payments that are tied to
the list price. Specifically, some patients pay full price until reaching a deductible; some
pay co-insurance as a percentage of the list price, rather than a flat copay.Thus, the study
also examines list price information.
Unsurprisingly, the trajectory for the list prices paid by health insurance plans is far
worse than for net prices. Between 2006 and 2017, the average dosage-unit list price
for brand drugs rises dramatically from $42 to $221, a 426% increase. In contrast, the
average dosage-unit price that health plans pay for generics remains relatively stable at
a low $3 to $4.115
III.B. The Shrinking Access to Generics
No matter how broad the lens, prices alone do not explain the full story of drug
accessibility in theUSA.Asdiscussed inprevious sections, insurers organize their drugs
within tiered formularies. Tiering ought to reflect the cost of a drug, with cheaper
generics placed on lower, less-expensive tiers and expensive brand drugs placed on
higher, more-expensive tiers. Insurers reward patients who choose cheaper drugs by
requiring smaller copays; more expensive drugs on higher tiers, in contrast, command
progressively large copays.116 The formulary system, in theory, drives down patients’
copays, reduces overall healthcare costs, and promotes the market for cheaper drugs.
The primary goal of the study involved empirically assessing whether the formu-
lary system is working as it should. Strikingly, the analysis reveals strong evidence of
distorted tier placement for generic drugs. First, generics are increasingly placed on
tiers that have higher costs for patients. For example, in 2010, 96% of generics are
placed on the two least-expensive tiers combined, formulary Tiers 1 and 2; by 2017,
this number shrinks to 66%. In particular, there is a serious decrease in the percentage
share of generics on Tier 1—the tier with the lowest cost for consumers—compared
with all other tiers. On that golden tier, the percentage of generics drops from 73% to
115 See 2011MedicareTrusteesReport, supranote 112, at 183 (noting that generic prescriptions generally
do not receive rebates).
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Figure 2. Average percentage of generic drugs across tiers on five-tier formularies.121
28%between 2010 and 2017.117 This occurs even though the cost that health plans pay
for generics remains stable.118
Onemight speculate that the reduction of the percentage of generics on the first tier
occurs because health plans are choosing one generic to favor over another generic.
However, given that tiering should reflect price119 and generics do not compete on
price,120 there should be no reason to preference certain generics over others in the
widespread manner that the study reveals, absent other economic distortions. To
the extent additional economic distortions are occurring, it may reflect other market
dynamics that are beyond the scope of this paper.
The data also show an increase in the percentage of generics on Tier 2, rising from
23% to 38%. Similarly, the percentage of generic drugs on Tiers 3 and 4 grows from a
negligible number to a combined 33% in 2017. Together, these represent a significant
shift toward more-expensive tiers for generics. In general, generics are noticeably
shifted fromTier 1 to higher tiers, withTier 2 now containing a plurality of the generics.
Nevertheless, although the percentage of generic drugs on Tiers 1 and 2 significantly
decreases during 2010–2017, nearly three in five generic drugs are still assigned to the
first two tiers. Thus, the major trend in generics is a shift from Tier 1 to Tier 2.
117 See infra Figure 8. In contrast, brand drugs on Tier 1 remained relatively constant throughout this time
period. See Appendix A4 (showing distribution of brand drugs on five-tier formularies). More broadly, the
percentage of brand drugs on formulary Tiers 3, 4, and 5 increased, particularly on Tiers 4 and 5, but there
was not a noticeable change shift away from Tier 1, as there was with generics. There was also a noticeable
decrease in the Tier 2 percentage share of brand drugs, from 28% to 7%. Taken together, the findings show
that while both brand and generic drugs are increasing placed on higher tiers, generics specifically are being
shifted away from the least-expensive tier, whereas brand drugs are remaining relatively stable on that tier.
118 See supra Figure 1.
119 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
120 See Ctrs. forMedicare &Medicaid Servs, supra note 112, at 183.
121 Tier 1 drugs offer the lowest copayment and are often generic versions of brand-name drugs; copayments
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Figure 3. Average copayment and co-insurance for the different tiers among workers with
insurance plans with three or more tiers.124
Pushing generics toward more-expensive tiers—even from Tier 1 to Tier 2—has
significant cost implications for consumers. According to one study, the average copay
increases three-fold when a drug moves from Tier 1 to Tier 2, increasing from $11 to
$33 as shown in Figure 3.122 Such copay amounts can add up quickly for a patient using
multiple medications across the entire year. Moreover, this increase in patient out-of-
pocket payments occurs despite the fact that the price health plans pay for generics on
Tier 2 is roughly the same as on Tier 1, as shown in the section below.123
As a general matter, formularies are intended to be designed so that drugs are
separated onto different tiers according to their price, with the exception of higher-
priced specialty generics and specialty brands grouped together on Tier 5.125 Thus, an
initial consideration concerns whether it makes sense from a price perspective to have
brands and generics on the same tier—that is, to what extent are brands and generics
priced similarly.
The study answers this question using rigorous and conservative statistical com-
parison testing of brands and generics placed on the same tier.126 Subsequent analysis
confirms that in the case of all tiers except for Tier 1, brand and generic drugs should
122 2017 Employer Health Benefits Survey, supra note 52. One should note that the Employer Health
Benefit Study reflects only co-pays, not co-insurance, although onewould expect any co-insurance portions
of the total payment to be low for generic drugs, given that generic prices are relatively low, ranging from $3
to $4. See supra Figure 1.
123 See supra Figure 1 (comparing average dosage-unit prices for generics on different tiers).
124 2017 Employer Health Benefits Survey, supra note 52.
125 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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not beplacedon the same tier: the dosage-unit price for brands is simply far greater than
the dosage-unit price for generics. Only for Tier 1 do brands and generics sometimes
belong together, given that some brand prices are as low as the price range for generics.
III.C. Irrational Tiering
Academic literature has explained that the prize of avoiding generic substitution drives
many strategic games in modern pharmaceutical markets.127 For example, in what is
euphemistically known as ‘life cycle management’, brand drug companies alter various
aspects of a drug—such as a drug’s dosage, formulation, or delivery system—shifting
themarket away from the version of their drug that is facing generic competition.128 As
a result, simply comparing drugs with their generic counterparts may not fully capture
the competitive dynamics of the market. Thus, this section of the study looks beyond
brand drugs and their direct generic substitutes, expanding the comparison to consider
drugs with the same active ingredient. For example, a brand drug in tablet formmay be
compared to a generic with the same active ingredient in capsule form, with a different
dosage, etc.
Of course, an approach that truly considers the entire competitive landscape would
also encompass competitors that have drugs with different active ingredients. Drug
companies undoubtedly know who their competitors are, even if those drugs only
compete off-label or in certain subsections of the market. One could think of such
as approach as comparing therapeutic competitors, a term that has not been used
previously in the literature.129 Identifying all such therapeutic competitors in order
to compare their formulary placement would be a truly daunting task. Nevertheless,
the study successfully expands the comparison to a degree by examining a subset of
therapeutic competitors—specifically, drugs containing the same active ingredient.130
127 See, eg, Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 26, at 34 and sources cited within (discussing the tactics and
strategies brand companies use to delay or prevent generic entry into the market); see Feldman, supra
note 6, at 18–26 and sources cited within (discussing the use of volume games by brand companies in
collaboration with PBMs to block generic entry into the market); Michael Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen
Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last Denied, 66 Am. L. Rev 305 (Aug. 2016).
128 See Feldman, supra note 6.
129 Therapeutic competitor is distinct from phrases such as ‘therapeutically equivalent’ or ‘directly substi-
tutable’. To be therapeutically equivalent under the FDA’s definition, the main active ingredients must be
the same, as well as the dosage form, route of administration, and strength. See Drugs@FDA Glossary of
Terms, U. S Food and Drug Administration (accessed Dec.16, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/
drug-approvals-and-databases/drugsfda-glossary-terms. The same general characteristicsmust be true for
pharmacists in a particular state to substitute a generic drug for a brand.
130 The use of active ingredients provided practical advantages, as well. FDA data are organized by ANDA
and NDA, whereas the CMS data are organized by NDC code. ANDA refers to Abbreviated New Drug
Application,which is the application for a generic to receiveproduct approval from theFDA,placing it in the
Orange Book once approved. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), U. S Food and Drug Admin-
istration (accessed Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/abbreviated-new-
drug-application-anda. NDC code refers to National Drug Code Directory, which is a national directory
of all drugs ‘manufactured, prepared, propagated, compounded, or processed’, published by the FDA.
National Drug Code Directory, U. S Food andDrugAdministration (accessedDec. 16, 2019), https://
www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases/national-drug-code-directory. Without a viable way
of mapping NDC codes to ANDA or NDA codes, it is difficult to pair up brand and generic drugs, which
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Comparing active ingredients, of course, is not a perfect measurement of substi-
tutability. Certain routes of administration, for example, may be particularly expensive,
although they may be better suited for a patient’s condition. Nevertheless, the dosage-
unit price calculations and the comparisons of brand costs with costs of generics
demonstrate that brands and generics, on the whole, have vastly different prices.131
Thus, although there may be outlying examples, brands and generics, as a general
matter, should not be on the same tier—which means that brands and generics of the
same active ingredient certainly should not be on the same tier.
Thus, this section of the study undertakes an empirically original analysis of ‘irra-
tional tiering’ in the formulary system—instances in which a brand and a generic with
the same active ingredient are placed on the same tier orwhen the generic is placed on a
more-expensive tier.132 Given that the CMS began recording complete formulary data
in 2010, the analyses in this section focus only on claims from2010 to 2017, rather than
the 12-year study period for pricing data.133
To ensure a valid comparison among drugs that have the potential for direct com-
petition with each other, the study examines only the subgroup of generics and brand
drugs that have the sameactive ingredientwithin the same, single healthplan formulary.
Generics with such brand competitors represent a relatively small portion of the drugs
on five-tier formularies, with the average percentage of these drugs dropping from 32%
to 29% between 2010 and 2017. Thus, it is important to note that in the section below,
the study demonstrates that a minor change to tier placement for a limited percentage
of drugs could lead to massive cost savings for patients and the federal government.
Even looking at this limited group, the study finds troubling evidence of irrational
tiering. In 2015, for example, 69% of generics experience at least one abnormal placing
relative to more expensive drugs with the same active ingredient. Moreover, the trend
is worsening over time. Specifically, the study finds that the percentage of all generics
that are irrationally tiered rises from 47% in 2010 to 74% in 2017.
The problem is not just that generics are being placed on the same tiers as brands
with the same active ingredient; increasingly, the generic is being placed on a ‘worse’
tier. Within the cohort of irrational placements, the distortion of same-tier placement
drops from98%to93%,whereasworse-tier placementmore than triples from2%to7%.
Thus, the combination of all results demonstrates that irrational tiering of generics is
increasing, with an increasing share of misplacements shifting toward placing generics
on a ‘more-expensive’ tier than a brand competitor with the same active ingredient.
Both of these trends indicate increasing irrationality in the tier-placement system.
131 See supra text accompanying notes 69–79 and Figure 1.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 13–14. One should note that in the relevant years, between 2010 and
2017, the majority of irrational tiering involved brand drugs with an active ingredient competitor placed
on the same formulary tier as their generic counterparts; only a small percentage of generic drugs fell on a
more-expensive tier.
133 See Data Dictionaries infra note 205; Part D Formulary File, Research Data Assistance Center
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Figure 4. Irrationally placed generics.
III.D. Wasted Spending Due to Irrational Tier Placement
Clearly, the formulary system is not working as intended. The question now is: how
muchdoes improper drugplacement affect spending?Addressing thequestion requires
a definition of spending.
III.D.i. Defining Spending
As described above, although average rebate information can be calculated for brand
drugs, the rebate for any particular drug is not available. Thus, calculating true wasted
costs when looking at a subset of drugs would be difficult to accomplish with preci-
sion. This particular challenge has confounded pharmaceutical researchers in other
circumstances, leaving uncertainty in its wake.
The study, however, is able to overcome this perennial problem. Although net price
remains out of reach, one canmeasure certain types of spending forwhich detailed data
are available. Thus, the study examines spending by calculating what patients actually
paid out of their own pockets for an individual drug purchase, combined with any
amount that the federal government paid for that purchase in the form of its Low-
Income Subsidy Program.134 These amounts provide a concrete and reliable method
for measuring true dollars out the door.
Details on the calculation of the cost to patients and the federal government can be
found at Appendix A3, but a few points are worth noting here. First, the calculation
is based on the assumption that abnormally placed generics should have been placed a
single tier below their actual tier placement.This is a highly conservative estimate; there
are likely circumstances in which the difference in tier placement should be greater,
based on the cost differential.
134 The amount that the government subsidizes is the Low-Income Subsidy; the government also subsidizes
Medicare premiums through a complex calculation. See The Ctrs. ForMedicare &Medicaid Servs.,
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Figure 5. Wasted spending from irrationally placed generics.
Second,Medicare enrollments135 play an important role in driving up wasted costs.
In 2010, irrationally tiered generics leads tomore than $50million of wasted spending.
By 2017, the amount of wasted spending increases by nearly a factor of 83, reaching
$4.17 billion. This dramatic increase flows both from the continuous increase inMedi-
care drug prescription plan enrollees and the increase in the cost of irrationally tiered
generics per beneficiary. In other words, when the number of plan enrollees increases,
the amount of spending increases, as does the amount of waste from that spending.
Third, the results are likely to seriously understate the costs of irrational tiering from
another perspective, as well. Specifically, the study examines only brand drugs with a
generic competitor having the same active ingredient. A drug may have other types of
therapeutic competitors, such as another drug with a different active ingredient that
could treat the same disease state or a subsection of the population with the disease
state, even if it might not treat all patients. To the extent that other forms of therapeutic
competitors are cheaper and there is irrational tiering, those would be added costs to
the patient and to the government. Even with these conservative approaches, the total
wasted spending across the 2010–2017 study period amounts to $13.25 billion.
III.E. Implications and Limitations
As noted above,136 examining Medicare claims data provides a useful approach for
understanding the inner workings of the health insurance system and the pharmaceu-
tical industry. Four elements make the Medicare system a particularly attractive venue
for researchers: (i) Medicare accounts for 29% of prescription drug spending in the
USA; (ii) the detailed, government-verified claims data available from the CMS are
135 In order to keep this estimate conserve, the study weighs the number of Medicare enrollments to reflect
only the count of five-tier enrollees. See infra Appendix A3.
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unavailable fromprivate insurers; (iii) certain problems inMedicare are likely to appear
in the health insurance system in general; and (iv) reforms may be easier to craft for
the Medicare system as an initial matter, before venturing into reforms of the private
insurance market.
Nevertheless, there would be limitations in generalizing from the Medicare system
to the whole. These may include less variation in the drugs the cohort buys, how
the drugs are covered by their insurance, the prices that they pay, the kind of rebates
one expects the plans to obtain, and so on. For example, an industry analyst report
concludes that rebates amount to a far larger percentage of point-of-service spending
for drug spending in Medicare Part D than in private health insurance planes.137 In
Medicare, rebates amount to 22% of spending; in private plans, the percentage is
12%, almost half of that amount.138 The analyst report hypothesizes that patients may
have different preferences in shopping for private plans than they do in shopping for
Medicare plans. Prescription coverage is purchased separately with Medicare plans,
in contrast to private plans, which may lead patients to evaluate the plans, and the
interactions between elements of the plans, differently.
It is possible that given differences in the private insurance and Medicare markets,
brand drug companies are relying less on rebates to drive consumers to their drugs
and more on coupons. With coupons and similar systems, drug companies reimburse
a patient for all or part of the patient’s copayment or co-insurance.139 Patients pay
less at the pharmacy counter. They may pay more; however, given that the insurance
plan’s cost for the higher-priced drug will filter through to higher premiums. For
this reason, Medicare does not allow the use of coupons, and some private plans
discourage coupons by refusing to count the amount covered by a coupon in a patient’s
deductible.140 And in the long run, of course, patients may pay more as lower-priced
substitutes are unable to gainmuch of a foothold in themarket or are discouraged from
entering the market at all.
The point is simply that differences between the private insurancemarket andMedi-
care insurance markets counsel caution in comparing the two. Comparisons between
the two may be instructive but not necessarily conclusive.
One should also note that the study does not examine how rebate dollars that are
returned to the health plan (as opposed to those retained by the PBMs) might flow
back into overall costs in the system. There is some evidence that rebates help to defray
‘premium’ costs—that is, the cost paid to enroll in a health plan—to patients.141 One
137 Charles Roehrig, The Impact of Prescription Drug Rebates on Health Plans and Consumers, Altarum
10 (Apr. 2018), https://altarum.org/sites/default/files/Altarum-Prescription-Drug-Rebate-Report_A
pril-2018.pdf .
138 See id.
139 See Feldman, supra note 6, at 53–55.
140 Michelle Andrews, Why Cannot Medicare Patients Use Drugmakers’ Discount Coupons? NPR (May
9, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/05/09/609150868/why-cant-medicare-pa
tients-use-drugmakers-discount-coupons; Emma Ryan & Emily Fitts, The Hidden Costs of Discount Cards:
Understanding Copay Accumulator Adjustment, diaTribe (Mar. 22, 2019) https://diatribe.org/hidden-
costs-discount-cards-understanding-copay-accumulator-adjustment.
141 Cf.Ctrs. forMedicaid &Medicare Servs., Fact sheet, Medicare Part D: Direct and Indirect
Remuneration(Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/medicare-part-d-direct-a
nd-indirect-remuneration-dir (stating that ‘PartDpremiums . . . have grownonlymodestly in comparison
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would have to determine how much flows back into premium reduction (as opposed
to executive pay or other expenditures), how those flowbacks affect the payment
allocations among different types of patients. For example, some have suggested that
to the extent rebates reduce premiums, they have the effect of shifting burdens away
from healthy patients and onto sick patients, the opposite of the manner in which an
insurance system is supposed to operate. 142
One would also have to calculate how much of the premium reduction is inadver-
tently funded by increased government subsidies through the Low-Income Subsidy
Program and potentially other increased reimbursements fromMedicare. For example,
the increased prices that fuel rebates also push patients more quickly into the portion
of Medicare in which the government picks up 80% of a patient’s costs.143 Thus,
rebates can have the effect of shifting expenditures from the health plan to the federal
government.144 All of these variables transform any calculation of how rebate dollars
flow into overall system expenditures into an exercise fraught with uncertainty and
potential inaccuracies. And of course, much of the necessary information is claimed as
a trade secret and deeply hidden.145 Thus, calculating the increased amounts patients
must pay out of pocket, along with the portion of that payment subsidized by the
government, provides a useful window into a tangible and immediate impact on those
parties.Moreover, given the complexities and timing shifts of the healthcare reimburse-
ment one would expect significant leakage to occur, even if every penny of the rebate
dollars—both the dollars retained by the PBMs and the dollars returned to the health
plans—were to flow back into premium reduction, which is an unlikely scenario itself.
Finally, interactions between drug costs and other elements of an insurance plan,
both for the patient and for the plan, raise tantalizing questions for future research.
Medication purchasing is only one element of the overall risk profile of a patient, and it
creates a form of signaling effect for both the patient and the plan. In other words, plans
wantmore people with amore profitable risk profile, and patients want plans that cover
their needs. The issue ismore complicated than simply trying to attract healthy patients
and discourage those who are less healthy—something that could be accomplished by
placing medications for HIV, for example, on a less-favored tier, thereby discouraging
142 Cf.MedPac Report, supra note 2 (stating that ‘Part D plan sponsors generally use rebates to offset benefit
costs [ie lower premiums for all plan enrollees) rather than to lower (point of sale) prices and cost sharing’];
Caitlin Owens, White House Kills Major Drug Pricing Proposal, Axios (Jul. 10, 2019), https://www.a
xios.com/trump-drug-prices-plan-pharma-ec527a14-0287-492b-937d-a7144c47b734.html [stating that
‘critics of the (Trump Administration anti-kickback rule) proposal argued it did nothing to require drug
makers to lower their prices and would’ve cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars’); Bob Herman,
All Eyes Are on the Drug Pricing Middlemen, Axios (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.axios.com/all-eyes-
drug-pricing-middlemen-pbms-rebate-rule-senate-79f57f2e-ad63-43e1-bead-e68f48472020.html (stat-
ing that ‘experts at the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee and the Pew Charitable Trusts both
wrote . . . the proposed regulation “is unlikely to reduce drug prices” and would create new windfalls for
drugmakers’).
143 Ctrs. for Medicaid & Medicare Serv., Fact sheet, Medicare Part D: Direct and Indirect
Remuneration (Jan. 19, 2017), www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/medicare-part-d-direct-and-indi
rect-remuneration-dir (explaining the relationship between lower plan liability and higher government
costs and noting in particular that the substantial rise experienced in the government’s costs results in part
because ‘gross drug cost growth is concentrated in the catastrophic phase . . . where Medicare covers 80%
of drug costs’).
144 See Feldman, supra note 6.
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patients who might impose a range of nonmedication costs on a plan. On a more
complex level, suppose that certain conditions are more profitable for a plan given
reimbursement levels or other factors. In that case, if the plan believes that patients
may prefer brand drugs for that disease state, the plan might choose to place both the
brand and generic on a favorable tier to attract patients with that disease state—or do
the reverse if it wished to discourage such patients. Comparisons between stand-alone
Medicare Part D drug plans and certain types of Medicare plans that also offer Part D
coverage146 could provide the opportunity to tease out some of these effects.
The results of the study, nevertheless, point to a clear, unmistakable conclusion: we
donot nearly live in an idealworld.The current formulary tier system for drug coverage,
which is intended to reduce both patient and government expenditures for prescription
drugs, is beingmanipulated to the advantageof insurers, drugmanufacturers, andPBMs
seeking greater profits at the expense of patients. Based purely on cost, the standard
for drug placement should be that cheaper generic alternatives are placed on lower,
less-expensive tiers with lower copays, whereas more-expensive brand drugs should be
placed on higher, more-expensive tiers requiring higher copays.147
Although insurers maintain that their formularies are structured according to this
ideal,148 the study’s examination paints a different picture. Brand and generic drugs
are increasingly placed together on the same tiers, despite significant cost differences
between the two. Within the nebulous haze that is the formulary system, few things
are clearer than the fact that the current system is being gamed and costing society
dearly. Observations such as these aremost useful, however, if they illuminate potential
pathways for reform.
IV. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTIONS149
Only a few solutions have been proposed to correct abuses of the formulary system,
in part, because formulary abuses seem to be a recently identified phenomenon.150
One Canadian academic suggested designing formularies based on evidence of head-
146 These are known as Medicare Advantage plans. Medicare Advantage Plans, Medicare (accessed
Aug. 18 2020), https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/types-of-medicare-health-plans/medi
care-advantage-plans
147 Even if there are factors other than cost such as clinical effectiveness that determine drug placement, the
cumulative effect of these factors is unable to account for the disparity that is seen between insurers’ claims
that cost is the primary criterion for placement and the contradicting reality that features generic and brand
drugs with significantly different costs occupying the same tiers.
148 See supra Section II.B.
149 For other proposed solutions to issues with the formulary tier system, see Gerard Anderson, Thomas
Cordeiro, Mariana Socal & Lauren Vela, Removing Waste from Drug Formularies, John Hopkins Drug
Access and Affordability Initiative, the Pacific Business Group on Health and Integrity
Pharmaceutical Advisors (Oct. 2019) (proposing an approach to formulary management whereby
the plan sponsors remove drugs that aremore expensive and do not provide greater clinical value compared
to other similar drugs). For prior literature on the formulary tier system, see eg Gordon D. Schiff et al., A
Prescription for Improving Drug Formulary Decision Making, 9 PLOSMed. 1 (2012); Bryan L. Walser et al.,
Do Open Formularies Increase Access to Clinically Useful Drugs?, 15HealthAffairs 95 (1996); Raymond J.
Seigfried et al.,Deciding Which Drugs Get Onto the Formulary: A Value-Based Approach, 16Value inHealth
901 (2013).
150 See AvalereHealth, supra note 90. For a discussion of entirely different approaches to cost-sharing in health
insurance, see Christopher T. Robertson, Exposed: Why Our Health Insurance is Incomplete
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to-head comparisons of drug efficacy and cost-effectiveness analyses with competing
medications, including real-world, postmarketing evaluations of effectiveness. 151 The
approach would establish a set of predetermined criteria in the formulary placement
process, restricting how certain drugs could be added or removed from formularies.
Such an approach, however, would be far easier to implement in a nation with a
single-payor system, such as Canada, than in the USA.
Generics industry actors, naturally, wish to restrict the ability of insurance plans to
place brand drugs on lower, less-expensive tiers.152 Similarly, theCMSproposed—and
subsequently scrapped—a rule that the lower tiers should be exclusively reserved for
generic drugs,withhigher tiers reserved for branddrugs.153 Although these approaches
would be an improvement over the current system, they leavemuch room formischief.
There is no single, accepted definition of what is a generic, and brand drug companies
engaged in strategic behavior regarding the term. For example, anecdotal evidence
has revealed brand companies withdrawing their product from the market so that the
generic version, as the only one on the market, would be treated as a brand under
reimbursement procedures.154 Moreover, the term ‘generic’ itself has becomemuddied
by the entrance of so-called authorized generics. Authorized generics are versionsmade
or licensed by the brand company using the generic name of the drug, normally at a
lower price than the brand. Any system that relies on a name with no agreed definition
of the naming convention is likely to encounter serious problems.155 At the end of the
day, one can call something a brand, a generic, or an elephant. It is the price thatmatters.
IV.A. Focusing on List Price
To solve the game playing andwaste, onemust return to the core rationale of the tiering
system. Specifically, what is the tiering system intended to accomplish, and howmight
society direct the system back to its goals, despite the complexities and competing
incentives. As a touchstone for the inquiry, modern tiering systems are supposed to be
based on the price of the drug, a rationale that is explicitly set out both in the academic
literature and in insurance planmaterials.156 But what price? As described above, price
is a slippery and murky concept.157
One might argue that tiering should be based on the net price. After all, that is the
bottom-line cost to the health insurer. Basing tiering on net price, however, presents a
host of problems. The first is that true net price is hidden—from the health insurance
151 Andreas Laupacis, Geoffrey Anderson & Bernie O’Brien, Drug Policy: Making Effective Drugs Available
Without Bankrupting the Healthcare System, 3 Healthcare Papers 12 (Feb. 2002).
152 Eg Letter fromMylan, supra note 90.
153 See Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., Advance Notice of Methodological Changes
for Calendar Year (CY) 2020 for Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates, Part C and
Part D Payment Policies and 2020 Draft Call Letter 180 (2019).
154 See Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 26. Along the same lines, one medical information company
explained in a call with the author that a brand manufacturer had requested to have its drug not designated
as a brand so that health insurance plans would cover it as generic.
155 Cf. Feldman, supra note 84 (presenting the bargain theory of patents and arguing that lack of a shared
conception for things that are new, limitations in language, and the problem of fixation in time make it
impossible for a patent to definitively identify the rights that have been granted, no matter what claiming
approach society chooses).
156 See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text; see also Copayment Tier Definitions, supra note 10 (citing
BlueShield materials describing tiers in terms of drug cost).
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plan, auditors, and regulators. This disappearing act makes it nearly impossible to track
andmonitor strategic or even downright illegal behavior. The convoluted nature of net
price also blunts its ability to operate as a signaling mechanism—for patients or even
for health plans.158
Most important, volume rebates allow companies with market power to provide
deals that cheaper, new entrants cannot meet. This is particularly problematic in the
context of new generic entering the market in the face of brand drugs coming off
patent, when those patents may have created a monopoly position in the market.
Thus, net price in the context of volume rebates may create insurmountable barriers
to competition, undermining the goal of having generic drugs bring down the price of
prescription medication. The long-term benefits of generic competition may be left in
the dust. In short, net price as a solution to tiering leaves much to be desired.
Aproblemof thismagnitude anddegreeof challenge requires an innovative solution.
The sweeping solution that this paper offers is that tiering shouldbebasedon ‘list’ price.
Yes, list price, a term that is roundly dismissed because it does not embody the hidden
rebate deals. Nevertheless, list price should be the key component in determining the
tier placement for all drugs. And as the discussion below will explain, list price is the
perfect regulatory solution for bringing some measure of sanity to the tiering system.
First, basing tieringon list pricebrings anend to the rebate andquasi-kickbackgames
that can harm competition and contribute to rising prices.159 One cannot overestimate
how difficult the rebate problem has been to address. Despite widespread recognition
of the problem involving rebates, regulatory attempts to reform this practice have
failed. Most recently, in February 2019, the Trump administration proposed a rule
to alter safe harbor protections under the federal Anti-Kickback statute so that drug
companieswould be prohibited in federal healthcare programs frompaying rebates tied
to a percentage of a drug’s list price to PBMs under federal health programs.160 The
proposal was limited in some aspects, offering two new safe harbor provisions: one that
wouldhave allowedPBMs tonegotiate rebateswithdrugmanufacturers as long as those
rebates were shared directly with patients at the point of sale and another that would
have allowed PBMs to receive fixed fees for services provided on behalf of insurers.161
In a report released inMay, however, theCongressionalBudgetOffice (CBO)projected
total prescription drug costs in the USA would not decrease if the proposed rule were
finalized.162 TheCBOpredicted that under the rule, drugmakers would ‘offer the rene-
gotiated discounts in the formof chargebacks’ instead of lowering drug list prices.163 As
a result, the CBO estimated that the rule would have increased government spending
158 See discussion supra Section 2.3.
159 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
160 Fraud and Abuse; Removal of Safe Harbor Protection for Rebates Involving Prescription Pharmaceuticals
and Creation of New Safe Harbor Protection for Certain Point-of-Sale Reductions in Price on Prescription
Pharmaceuticals and Certain Pharmacy Benefit Manager Service Fees, 84 Fed. Reg. 2340 (Feb. 6, 2019).
161 Id.
162 Congressional Budget Office, Incorporating the Effects of the Proposed Rule on Safe
Harbors for Pharmaceutical Rebates in CBO’s Budget Projections—Supplemental Mate-
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by a total of $177 billion from 2020 to 2029.164 The administration eventually pulled
the proposal to eliminate drug rebates in July.165
In addition to the risk of developing new games, efforts to reform rebates have been
stymied by the concern that drug companies could simply pocket the amounts previ-
ously offered as rebates without lowering prices. In theCBO’s assessment of theTrump
administration’s proposal to eliminate rebates, for example, the agency predicted that
drug companies would ‘withhold about 15% of the amounts they currently rebate to
PBMs in Part D and would negotiate discounts approximately equal to the remaining
85%’.166 Rather than lowering list prices, the agency expected thatmanufacturerswould
pocket most of the savings themselves rather than pass them on to consumers.167
Without the capacity to negotiate drug discounts, Medicare would have to bear the
brunt of the costs, leading to increases in premiums and government spending.168
Focusing on list price, however, has the potential to directly address high pharma-
ceutical prices, while avoiding the unintended consequences of directly eliminating
rebates. If tiers were based on list price, a drug company that raised its price to give
space for rebates and other payments to PBMs would find that the strategy backfires.
The high list price would drive the company’s product to a less-advantageous tier,
in comparison to cheaper substitutes. This would flip the perverse incentives of the
current system—in which ‘raising’ prices provides a competitive advantage—on its
head.169 And as one would expect in a free-market system, lower price would make a
company more competitive.170 Hidden negotiations and tempting rebate deals would
not matter, regardless of whether payments were designed as rebates, chargebacks, or
in some other manner; they simply would not factor into competitive placement.
Basing tiering on list prices provides additional advantages. The approach sidesteps
the need for greater transparency regarding negotiations between PBMs and drug-
makers by avoiding the practical problem of navigating around claims to trade secret
protection.171 No one claims that ‘list’ price is a trade secret. Moreover, Medicare
regulations already requires drug companies to report the list price, including providing
penalties for failure to report.
164 Id.
165 See Caitlin Owens,White House kills major drug pricing proposal, Axios (July 10, 2019), https://www.axi
os.com/trump-drug-prices-plan-pharma-ec527a14-0287-492b-937d-a7144c47b734.html.
166 Congressional Budget Office, supra note 162, at 2.
167 See Congressional Budget Office, supra note 162.
168 See Yasmeen Abutaleb, Amy Goldstein & Ashley Parker, Trump Kills Key Drug Price Proposal He
Once Embraced, Washington Post (July 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/busine
ss/economy/white-house-kills-key-drug-pricing-rule-to-eliminate-hidden-rebates/2019/07/11/
ff595192-a3de-11e9-bd56-eac6bb02d01d_story.html.
169 See generally, Robin Feldman, Perverse Incentives: Why Everyone Prefers High Drug Prices—Except for Those
Who Pay the Bills, 57 Harv. J. on. Legis. 303 (describing perverse incentives of the rebate system in which
raising prices allows room for rebates and other payments that disadvantage competitors) https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3162432 (accessed Oct. 30, 2020).
170 Implementation of this solutionmay require a transition period for themarket.While themarket readjusts,
prices may be higher for a period of time while market actors acclimate to the new incentive structure.
However, onewould anticipate that list prices will slowly and steadily be reduced to secure drug placements
on more preferable tiers.
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Basing tiering on list price potentially could be accomplished with regulatory
changes through the Department of Health and Human Services that could be
mandated by Congress. The CMS, the part of HHS that oversees Medicare,172 already
exercises authority over formularies and formulary design.173 Medicare’s Prescription
Drug Manual, as updated in 2018, specifies that a plan must include ‘Provision of an
Adequate Formulary’, and that the agency will ‘consider specific drugs, tiering and
utilization management strategies employed in each formulary’.174 At present, the
Manual suggests that CMS’ exercise of authority will revolve around ensuring that
plans follow common practice in the industry. For example, the Manual notes that
plans are encouraged to submit formularies similar to those in widespread use today,
and that the Agency will identity outliers for further evaluation.175
As of 2018, CMS’ Manual identifies its authority to regulate formularies as flowing
from the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, with its requirement that a plan’s
categorization system does not ‘substantially discourage enrollment by any group of
beneficiaries’.176 Earlier CMS guidelines on formularies, however, describe the goal of
the Medicare Modernization Act (and the Agency’s guidelines, themselves) in terms
of cost, explaining that the CMS will review plans to ‘assure that beneficiaries receive
clinically appropriate medications at the lowest possible costs’ and that ‘the goal is
for plans to provide high-quality cost-effective drug benefits by negotiating the best
possible prices and using effective drug utilization management techniques’.177
To the extent CMS’ earlier view of its authority is accurate, the Agency could
reach beyond simply requiring that plans look like other plans on the market and
specify tiering according to list prices, in the interests of providing high-quality cost-
effective drug benefits. Even if courts were to conclude that CMS’ authority under
the Medicare Modernization Act is narrower, the basic pathway exists. With CMS
already reviewing and providing guidance on formularies, Congress could provide any
additional authority necessary to further regulate formularies.
Given that CMS already requires that drug companies submit their list prices, 178
the Agency has the necessary information. Expansion of the regulations to provide for
verificationof the information, alongwith awillingness to enforce the regulation,would
be important.179 Although companies that provide inaccurate reports can be subject
to civil monetary penalties or terminated from the drug rebate program, compliance
172 See Ctrs. For Medicare &Medicaid Servs., About CMS, https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/About-CMS
(accessed Aug. 19, 2020).
173 See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Manual:
Chapter 6—Part D Drugs and Formulary Requirements § 30.2 (2018). (hereinafter Medicare
PDBM Chapter 6 § 30.2); MMA Final Guidelines on Formularies, supra note 48. See alsoHPMS
Guidance History, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescri
ption-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/HPMS-Guidance-History (accessed Oct. 24, 2012)
(listing past Medicare prescription drug guidance materials distributed to plans by CMS’ Health Plan
Management System).
174 Medicare PDBMChapter 6 § 30.2, supra note 173.
175 Medicare PDBMChapter 6 § 30.2, supra note 173.
176 Medicare PDBMChapter 6 § 30.2, supra note 173.
177 MMA Final Guidelines on Formularies, supra note 48.
178 HHS Report, supra note 59, at 4.
179 See supra text accompanying notes 62–64 (describing some failure of drug companies to report and efforts
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problems have existed in the past. For example, in 2008, over half of the manufacturers
did not fully comply with the quarterly submission requirements and three-quarters
did not fully comply withmonthly requirements.180 Over time, the Office of Inspector
General has indicated a willingness to step up enforcement efforts.181 The Inspector
General’s Office even suggested that CMS use its authority to impose $10,000 per day
fines for late reporting.182 Nevertheless, the existenceof open list pricing creates an easy
avenue for developing a modicum of accountability.
Ideally, tiering reforms would be applied to all insurance plans. The political diffi-
culty of instituting such a broad change for the entire healthcare insurance industry,
however, could be challenging, and the prospect of wading into the treacherous waters
of theprivate healthcaremarketwouldbedaunting. Instead,moving tiering to list prices
would bemore easily adopted through theMedicare system, which has the potential to
create ripple effects in the private insurance market.
IV.B. Staying Ahead of the Game
Legislative and regulatory changes happen slowly and infrequently. In contrast, strate-
gic behavior by the players in the system constantly shifts and evolves. As any chess
player can attest, blocking the last move will never be enough to succeed. One has to
play forward, anticipating reactions and setting pathways formanaging likely responses.
With this in mind, two additional sets of reforms would be important within the CMS
regulatory approach: transparency and rational tiering rules.
IV.B.i. Transparency
Creating tiers based on list price is a sensible departure from the current system.
Nevertheless, without transparency regulations and the capacity for enforcement, the
formulary system remains ripe for abuse. Strategic behaviors can simply shift their
forms—from gaming the tiering system, to gaming net prices, to gaming list prices, to
new games.
Information symmetry is oneof the prerequisites for functioningmarkets,183 and, as
many scholars have observed,184 the healthcare and insurance markets are plagued by
asymmetric information—with sophisticated institutions having vastly more knowl-
edgeable than individual consumers. Although formulary tiers are supposed to serve
as a way of partially addressing this information asymmetry, the murkiness permeating
the formulary system can only enhance the likelihood that insurers construct irrational
tiers. To ensure that the door guarding formulary tiers is closed to further abuse, as well
180 See Office of Inspector General, DrugManufactures’ Noncompliance with Average Man-
ufacturers Price Reporting Requirements, Dep’t Health & Human Servs. i–iii (Sept. 2010)
https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-09-00060.pdf .
181 See id.
182 See id. at 4.
183 What is Information Asymmetry, The Economist, Sept. 5, 2016, https://www.economist.com/the-e
conomist-explains/2016/09/04/what-is-information-asymmetry.
184 See, eg, Martin J. D’Cruz & Ranjan B. Kini,The Effect of Information Asymmetry on Consumer Driven Health
Plans, 1 Integration and Innovation Orient to E-Society 353; James H. Cardon & Igal Hendel,
Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey, 32 The
RAND J. of Econ. 408; Gerald Bloom et al., Markets, Information Asymmetry and Health Care: Towards
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as to prevent arbitrary construction of tiers, it is imperative to accompany tiering based
on list price with regulations heightening transparency.185
For example, data regarding the tiering system should be fully available to the
public in an easily understood format so that any interested party, including patients,
government regulators, academics, competitors, and the press can easily access infor-
mation regarding how tiers are structured and how drugs are placed on those tiers.
By making this information publicly available, various stakeholders can use the data
as a check to ensure that the formulary system remains free from abuse. Publicly
available information also helps to ensure that driving patient behavior—which is the
goal of the tiering system in the first place—both occurs and occurs in an appropriate
manner. Moreover, the capacity to more easily investigate PBMs and health insurance
companies fosters greater accountability and lessens the incentive for these players to
game the tier system for short-term profits. These checks—regulation by interested
parties and self-regulation—facilitate the construction of sensible tiers and reinforce
the storied principle that a free press, an informed citizenry, and a free market go hand
in hand.
To be clear, transparency measures should go beyond information about list prices
and tiering. Pharmaceutical market functioning and competition suffer dramatically
from a shadowy lack of information.186 As I have noted in the past, ‘[M] arkets, like
gardens, grow best in the sun’.187
Different pathways are available for transparency. These could include resolving the
issue through trade secret law itself, either by court decisions clarifying that pharmaceu-
tical prices and pricing terms are not trade secrets188 or by Congressional clarification
of the point. Taking a page from the requirement that pharmaceutical companies share
safety and efficacy data for the benefit of prospective generics,189 legislative changes
could mandate that to obtain marketing approval of a drug, the company must agree
to share pricing information with the market. Regardless of the pathway, games will
continue to flourish in dark corners unless we shine a little light.
IV.B.ii. Rational Tiering Rules
In addition to the need for greater transparency, regulatory authorities would need to
implement both a rules-based and a standards-based approach. Even after adopting a
tiering system based on list price, one could imagine a plethora of avenues to game the
formulary system and circumvent the spirit of this proposal. Suppose pharmaceutical
companies induce health insurers to construct tiers such that copayment patterns
185 On the importanceof transparency legislation, see, eg, Feldman, supranote 6 at 95–97; Feldman&Graves,
supra note 19, at 11; Feldman& Frondorf, supra note 23, at 135–136.
186 See Feldman, supra note 6, at 95–97; Robin Feldman, Transparency, 19 Virginia J. L. & Tech. 272,
278–83 (2014) (discussing in depth the need for approaches to ensuring transparency in pharmaceutical
markets, as well as the arguments in opposition to transparency).
187 Feldman, supra note 6, at 95 (discussing in depth the need for approaches to ensuring transparency in
pharmaceutical markets, as well as the arguments in opposition to transparency).
188 See Feldman &Graves, supra note 19.
189 Known colloquially as theHatch–WaxmanAct, the formal name is theDrug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). See also Robin Feldman, Regulatory
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reflect little about a drug’s actual price. One could accomplish that, for example, by
having patients pay roughly the same for different tiers or by grouping large swaths of
drugs on the same tier.
Tomake the example easier to understand, imagine a systemwith 10 or even 20 tiers
andminimal differences in copays between the tiers. For example, suppose patients pay
a $20 copay for drugs on Tier 8 (a less-expensive tier) and a $20.50 copay for drugs on
Tier 9 (a slightly more-expensive tier) and that the generic version of a drug is placed
on the less-expensive Tier 8, whereas the brand version of the drug is placed on the
slightly more-expensive Tier 9. At first glance, that might appear perfectly acceptable:
the generic is on a tier that is preferred over the brand tier. The patient, however, would
be paying a tiny amount more for the brand than for the generic. The brand drug
namemay bemore familiar to the patient—particularly if the brand’s patent protection
has recently ended—or the patient may believe that the ‘brand’ is better. Advertisers
already know that these issues can affect patient buying patterns, with advertisers in
all fields urging consumers to buy the original and pharmaceutical advertisers urging
patients ‘tell your doctor to write the prescription for the brand only’.190 In those
circumstances, patients could easily choose the brand over the generic when the copays
are roughly the same.
Similarly, imagine tiering organizedwithmost drugs groupedonto one tier. Suppose
the least-expensive tier—Tier 1—is designated for drugs with a list price of $0–$0.01,
Tier 2 for drugs with a list price of $0.02–$0.03, and Tier 3 for drugs with a list price
of $0.04–$10,000. Health insurers could charge copays on Tier 3 drugs that do not
correspond to the real price of the drugs; a Tier-3 drug could have a list price of $4
or $4000. These examples are drawn in the extreme, but the point is that if tiers are
constructed so that placement is meaningless, the tiering system loses its power.
Complexity breeds opportunity,191 and the pharmaceutical payment and delivery
is a marvel of complexity. In these circumstances, a rules and standards approach is
important for avoiding a whack-a-mole approach to the problem of pharmaceutical
pricing, particularly considering that the mole can move faster and more frequently
than the mallet. As this author has noted, ‘[t]he goal with a standards-based approach
would be look at the overall effect of a behavior in an effort to thwart those who
follow the letter of the law, but manage to arrive at a destination that the law intends
to forbid’.192
In pursuing a rules-based and standards-based approach, tax law’s step-transaction
doctrine provides a helpful analogy. As with healthcare, tax law is a heavily rules-based
area with precise regulations. Nevertheless, tax law’s step-transaction doctrine states
that even if firms may have managed to follow all the rules, tax authorities have the
requisite authority to collapse all steps in a transaction if the steps are part of an overall
plan to avoid taxation.
The same principle would apply to drug price tiering. A standards-based approach,
in tandemwith a rules-based approach, is necessary to ensure that formularies properly
190 See, eg, Feldman & Frondorf, supra note 26, at 71 (‘As of mid-2016, for example, Genentech provided
a CellCept copay card to consumers on the same website pushing doctors to prescribe only the branded
medication’.).
191 See Feldman, supra note 6, at 108–9.
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implement tiering based on list price, without taking advantage of loopholes thatmight
‘follow all the rules’ but circumvent the spirit of the proposal. Specifically, a rational-
tiering standard would head off future problems by requiring that formularies cannot
be set in a way that conflicts with the rule’s intended end, that is greater transparency,
greater competition, and lower prices. Once again, a rational-tiering standard could be
implemented by regulation or legislation in concert with implementation of the rule to
base tiering on list price.
CMS regulation, of course, is itself subject to the limitations of any agency action.
Scholars have spilled oceans of ink on the topic of agency capture and the challenges
of creating efficient and effective expert agencies that are sufficiently independent
of influence by industry or politics.193 Nevertheless, regulatory agencies remain the
nation’s best method for the type of detailed and nimble supervision that would be
necessary to impose ameasure of rationality in insurance plan reimbursement systems.
IV.C. What Basing Tiering on List Price Cannot Solve
No single solution can possibly solve all problems within the formulary system,
let alone with pharmaceutical pricing. The study and its recommendations cannot
address the staggering price of new drugs coming on the market, particularly in the
realm of cancer treatment. In those realms, it will be years, or more likely decades,
before generic alternatives may enter the market.194
One should also note this study and its resulting recommendations focus on compe-
tition between brand and generic drugs. As such, the recommendations presuppose a
functioning genericsmarket. If other strategic behaviors blockor hinder thatmarket,195
all the formulary reform in the world will not help. This is the case regardless of the
extent to which the problems stem from behaviors by brand companies, behaviors
within the generic market itself,196 or structural problems such as tiny markets with
193 See generally Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J. L. Econ., & Org. 167 (1990); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The
Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 The Q. J. of Econ. 1089
(1991);William J.Novak et al., PreventingRegulatoryCapture: Special Interest Influence
andHow to Limit It (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013).
194 Patent protection lasts for twenty years from the date of the patent application, and industry estimates
suggest that companies average 12 years of remaining patent protection when a drug reaches market. See
RobinFeldman,May Your Drug Price Be Evergreen, 5Oxford J. L.&Biosci. 590, 598–9 (2018) (‘Estimates
suggest that the average remaining patent period for a new drug is 12 years. Although far less than a term of
20 years from the time of a patent application, 12 years of exclusivity is a considerable reward, particularly
for a blockbuster drug that will garnermany billions of dollars a year in revenue’.). Companies have become
adept at extending that protection by piling on additional patents and exclusivities. See id. (finding that 78%
of the drugs associated with new patents between 2005 and 2015 were not new drugs but existing ones).
195 See Feldman, supra note 194, (examining the extent of evergreening or artificially extending the patent
protection cliff and its anticompetitive effects); Robin Feldman et al., Empirical Evidence of Drug Pricing
Games—A Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray, 20 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 39 (2017) (exploring the abuse of the
citizen petition process by drug companies to delay the approval of generic competitors); Robin Feldman&
PriankaMisra,The Fatal Attraction of Pay-for-Delay, 18Chicago-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 101 (investigating
the use of pay-for-delay tactics to stifle competition).
196 Jonathan D. Alpern, William M. Stauffer & Aaron S. Kesselheim, High-Cost Generic Drugs—Implications
for Patients and Policymakers, New Engl. J. Med. (Nov. 13, 2014) (examining the phenomenon of
exorbitant price increases of generic drugs not protected by patents or market exclusivity). See Diane
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low demands.197 If generic markets are not competitive and thriving, little ground can
be gained.
In addition, the generics industry must be able to deliver medications of reliable
quality.Recent concernshave arisen regarding thequality of ingredients inmedications.
For example, in 2020, the FDA recommended that five generic companies recall their
versions of the diabetes medication, metformin, in light of tests showing the presence
of the carcinogen NDMA.198 The potential concerns are not limited to generic drugs,
of course. For example, the FDA in 2020 recalled the brand-name drug Zantac in light
of the same carcinogen.199
Beyond contamination issues, there can be slight variations between brand and
generic drugs. Although a generic must have the same active ingredient as the brand,
the FDA allows certain variations in inactive ingredients.200 Similarly, the FDA sets the
parameters for the extent to which there may be small variations in purity, size, and
strength—not just between the brand version of a drug and the generic version but
even among different batches of the same drug from the same brand company.201 The
generics industry, as well as the entire industry, must be able to deliver medications of
consistent quality and potency, for consumers and health plans to be willing to trust
them.
Of course, if a generic drug is of poor quality, the solution is not to charge patients
more to purchase it. That would be a strange approach given that drugs of poor quality
simply should not be on a formulary list. Moreover, in that scenario, the plan would
save money by buying a cheap drug of low quality and then would be able to line its
pockets by charging patients a premium for that low-quality product. That would be
truly perverse. The solution for quality concerns should lie in testing, both at the time
of approval and across the production period. Charging patients more for low quality
should never be a solution.
In short, soaring pharmaceutical pricing is a difficult and complex problem that
deeply affects the lives of patients throughout the USA. There is no magic bullet.
Nevertheless, the off-kilter tiering system makes a substantial contribution to the
problem. As the study demonstrates, abuses of the formulary system conservatively
cost patients and the government over $50 million in 2010 and over $4.17 billion in
2017 alone. And the problem is growing across time. The number of drugs placed
on irrational tiers increases from 47% to 74% across the eight-year study period. And
kers-of-price-fixing-lawsuit-idUSKCN1SH0DP(reporting a lawsuit filed by a coalition of 44 states alleging
20 major drug manufacturers artificially inflated the prices of over 100 generic drugs).
197 See Nadia Whitehead, Why a Pill That’s 4 Cents in Tanzania Costs Up to $400 in the U.S., NPR (Dec.
11, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/12/11/567753423/why-a-pill-thats-4-ce
nts-in-tanzania-costs-up-to-400-in-the-u-s.
198 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Alerts Patients and Health Care Professionals to
Nitrosamine Impurity Findings in Certain Metformin Extended-Release Products (May 28, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-alerts-patients-and-health-care-professi
onals-nitrosamine-impurity-findings-certain-metformin.
199 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Requests Removal of All Ranitidine Products (Zantac)
from the Market (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-requests-
removal-all-ranitidine-products-zantac-market.
200 U.S. Food&DrugAdmin.,GenericDrugs:Questions&Answers, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/questions-a
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the percentage of generics on the least-expensive tier drops from 73% to 28%. Society
cannot hope for a thriving generic market—one that can inject competition and bring
down pricing—when generics are increasingly losing out in the battle for valuable
tiering space.
Tiering lies at the heart of what drives patient behavior, but the devil is in the tiers.
By reforming legislative or regulatory rules to require that tiers are based on list price,
government officials can restore proper incentives in the drug coverage system, with
the happy side effect of discouraging anticompetitive rebate and kickback schemes.
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Appendix B
Rebate Calculations
The average rebate percentages provided in the Medicare Trustees Reports202 are calcu-
lated across all prescription drugs (brands and generics). Therefore, the study needed an
approach to modify these rebate percentages to reflect brand drugs only. The methodology
of deriving average rebates of brand drugs from the average rebates of all drugs is according
to the following formulas:
• Rebate % = (Rebate Amount/Total Spending) ∗ 100
• Total Spending = Brand Spending+Generics Spending
• Rebate % = [Rebate Amount/(Brand Spending+Generics Spending)] ∗ 100
• Assuming generics did not receive any rebates, then:
• Rebate % for Brand = (Rebate Amount/Brand Spending) ∗ 100
• Brand Spending percentages are derived from the CMS data.
The calculations and findings are as follows:
Step 1: Rebates across all prescription drugs fromMedicare Trustees reports.
FromMedicare Trustees reports













202 Trustees Reports (current and prior), Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., https://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/TrusteesRe
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Step 2: Brand and generics spending from CMS sample data.








8.6 81 19 100
9.6 80 20 100
10.4 78 22 100
11.1 77 23 100
11.3 77 23 100
11.5 78 22 100
11.7 73 27 100
12.9 72 28 100
14.3 74 26 100
18.2 76 24 100
19.9 75 25 100
21.8 75 25 100
Step 3: Rebate % for brand.
Year Rebate amount Brand spending Rebate % for brand
2006 8.6 81 10.6
2007 9.6 80 12.0
2008 10.4 78 13.3
2009 11.1 77 14.4
2010 11.3 77 14.7
2011 11.5 78 14.7
2012 11.7 73 16.0
2013 12.9 72 17.9
2014 14.3 74 19.3
2015 18.2 76 23.9
2016 19.9 75 26.5
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Appendix C
Estimated Cost to Patients and the Federal Government Calculations
Themain formula used to calculate the cost estimate to society of the abnormal placement
of generic drugs on formulary tiers is as follows:
Cost to Society = Beneficiary Average Cost ∗ Part D Enrollee Count
Where the Beneficiary AverageCost is calculated based on five-tier formularies, and Part
D Enrollee Count is weighted to reflect only the count of five-tier enrollees.
Part D Enrollee Count is provided by the Chronic Conditions Data Warehouse web-
site.203 The average cost of abnormally placed generics per beneficiary was determined by
calculating the cost per formulary and dividing it by its beneficiary count:
Beneficiary Average Cost = Formulary Total Cost
Formulary Beneficiary Count
The calculation of the Formulary Total Cost (of abnormal generics placement) is based
on the assumption that the proper placement of a generic drug is one tier lower than its
actual tier placement. The formula used to calculate the Formulary Total Cost is as follows:
Formulary Total Cost =
∑n
i=0Actual Generic Total Spendingi
−Presumed Generic Total Spendingi
Where n is the number of generics with abnormal placement in a formulary.
To compute the actual total spending of a generic, the study adds the total amount
patients paid to what Part D subsidized for the specified drug, as per the following formula:
Actual Generic Total Spending = Total Amount Patient Paid + Total Part D Spending
To compute the presumed generic total spending, the study calculates the generic
volume, or the number of times a generic was filled, and multiplies it by its formulary
generics average spending of one tier lower than its actual tier ID. Formulary generics
average spending is the average of patient paid amounts and Part D spending calculated
separately for each formulary. The formula used to calculate the presumed generic total
203 Medicare Part D Charts, ChronicConditionsDataWarehouse, https://www2.ccwdata.org/web/gue
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spending is as follows:
Presumed Generic Total Spending =
Generic Volume ∗ Formulary Generics Average SpendingActual Tier ID−1
The study calculates the Formulary Generics Average Spending for each tier in the five-
tier formulary. The average generic spending of each formulary tier is the result of the sum
of total patient paid amounts and the total Part D spending, divided by generics count, or
the number of generic drugs on this specific tier.
Formulary Generics Average SpendingTier ID=i =
Total Amount Patient PaidTier ID=i + Total Part D SpendingTier ID=i
Generics CountTier ID=i
Where i is between [1, 5]
Appendix D
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The study seeks to identify and measure game playing within the formulary tiering system
using Medicare Part D data collected by the CMS. The study hypothesizes that brand
drugs are being placed in advantageous tiers, whereas generic drugs are being placed in
disadvantaged tiers and that this behavior is increasing across time.
V.B. Methodology Details
V.B.i. The Data
The study period covers a 12-year period from2006 to 2017 following a cohort of just under
one million patients. The cohort request was designed with the following parameters: all
patients in the cohort were alive during the entire study period, and each patient had at least
one prescription drug event during the study period. A prescription drug event represents
a patient filling a prescription drug at a pharmacy, and this article will refer to it as a drug
purchase. All the patients in the cohort were enrolled inMedicare Part A, B, andD coverage
only—excluding Part C. In other words, all the patients in the cohort were only enrolled in
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This study defines a ‘drug’ by its unique National Drug Code (NDC), which serves as
a universal product identifier for a drug. An NDC is a numerical code with three segments
representing: the drug’s labeler204 (eg Pfizer Consumer Healthcare), product and dosage
(e.g. Advil), and package (eg 24 tablets in one bottle).205 As is required by the Drug Listing
Act of 1972, drugs are identified and reported to the FDA using NDCs.
Each data entry represents one drug purchase in a larger file called the Part D Event
file. Each drug purchase entry corresponds to one NDC—in other words, there is never
more than one drug associated with one drug purchase entry. From each drug purchase
entry, there were corresponding data about the drug itself, including the formulary the drug
purchased was in, and how much the drug cost for the various payers. Payers include the
patient, Medicare Part D, and the health insurance plan. The drug purchase files reflect the
payments at the point of sale and do not include amounts thatmay be given as rebates to the
health insurance plan later on.206
Before starting the data analysis, the data were filteredmultiple times in order to analyze
and draw accurate conclusions based on relevant data. The first layer of elimination is
removing all drug event data where the drug purchased was covered under an ‘enhanced’
benefit package. Some plan sponsors offer an ‘enhanced’ benefit package that covers non-
Part D drugs, such as over-the-counter (OTC) medications. In other words, the study
eliminates all drug event data where the drug purchased was covered under the ‘enhanced’
benefit package that covers non-PartDdrugs orOTCmedications.207 Non-PartDdrugs are
not relevant to the analysis,whichdraws conclusionsbasedon theMedicarePartDprogram.
The study takes more steps to filter and organize the data, which is detailed further in this
section.
V.B.ii. Categorizing Drug Data as Brand or Generic
Comparing brand and generic drug placement on formulary tiers required categorizing all
the drugs in the data, represented by NDCs, as either brand or generic. One would assume
204 The labeler can be the manufacturer, marketer, repackager, or distributor of the product.What is NDC?,
National Drug Codes List, https://ndclist.com/what-is-ndc.
205 Id. The study regards a ‘drug’ and ‘NDC’ as equivalent terms and use them interchangeably. The study
chooses to define a ‘drug’ at the NDC level because it was the drug identifier variable included in the data.
Variables included in the data can be found under the Medicare Part D section of the Data Dictionaries
provided by the Chronic Conditions Data Warehouse, the research database created by CMS. Data Dictio-
naries, Ctrs. for Medicare &Medicaid Servs. (CMS), https://www2.ccwdata.org/web/guest/data-
dictionaries.
206 See supra text accompanying notes 68–76 (describing the rebate system and its timing).
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that categorizing drugs as brand or generic would be simple enough, but there are no hard
and fast rules for classifying a particular drug as brand or generic.
One possible categorization method is to map each drug to their associated New Drug
Application (NDA) or Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) codes. Respectively,
NDAs and ANDAs represent brand and generic drugs at the FDA approval level.208 How-
ever, there is no existing mapping system between NDCs and NDAs or ANDAs.209 The
FDA only publishes records of active NDCs,210 and a significant number of NDCs have
been removed during the observed time period (2006–2017).211 The study attempted
to find historical records through internet archiving but was unsuccessful. Commercial
databases (such as CernerMultum, First Databank, Medi-Span) also had limited to no data
on historical NDCs codes.
Thus, the drug data were categorized as brand or generic using three sources in the
following order: the original CMS data, National Library of Medicine’s RxNorm database,
and Cerner Multum’s commercial drug database.
• The CMS dataset includes a variable that indicated whether the insurance plan pro-
cessed the drug purchased as a brand or generic drug.212 However, CMS only began
collectingdataunder this variable in2012,whichwouldhave limited the years of analysis
from 2006 to 2011.
• The National Library of Medicine’s RxNorm database categorized the drugs that CMS
could not determine.213 The study uses a web service developed at theNational Library
208 New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. Food & Drug Administration, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/
types-applications/new-drug-application-nda; Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), U.S. Food
&Drug Administration, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/abbreviated-new-drug-applicati
on-anda.
209 See Himali Saitwal et al., Cross-Terminology Mapping Challenges: A Demonstration Using Medication Ter-
minological Systems, 45 J. Biomed. Inform. 613 (2012) (describing the difficulties of mapping between
numerous and nonequivalent medication terminological systems).
210 See National Drug Code Directory, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/
drug-approvals-and-databases/national-drug-code-directory.Thedirectory is updateddaily,meaning that
NDCs that are no longer on market disappear from the directory on a daily basis.
211 NDCs can become obsolete for many reasons, including (but not limited to): discontinuation for safety
reasons, a change in drug packaging, or discontinuation for economic reasons. The RxNorm database,
which the study uses as part of its methodology in categorizing drugs as brand or generic, does maintain
history information for its own identifiers, but does not keep track of obsolete NDCs. Lee B. Peters &
Olivier Bodenreider, Approaches to Supporting the Analysis of Historical Medication Datasets with RxNorm,
AMIA Ann. Symp. Proc. Arch. 1034 (2015). It is important to note that NDCs also hold potential for
gameplaying, as theFDAdoes not assignNDCs to approveddrugs—thepharmaceuticalmanufacturers do.
Specifically, althoughmanufacturers are supposed to permanently retire NDCs for products that have been
removed from the market, but manufacturers have been known to reuse NDCs after a period of inactivity.
212 Brand-Generic Code Reported by Submitting Plan, ResearchDataAssistanceCenter (accessedAug. 19,
2020), https://www.resdac.org/cms-data/variables/brand-generic-code-reported-submitting-plan.
213 The National Library of Medicine is a medical library and an institute within the National Institutes of
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ofMedicine, called RESTfulWeb API, that allows a user to access, make queries to, and
customize RxNorm data.214
• Cerner Multum’s commercial database provided final categorization for the remaining
drugs which were left uncategorized by CMS and RxNorm.215
Using the three databases mentioned above, the study is able to categorize 95.5% of all
drugs in the CMS data as brand name or generic (60,317 out of a total of 63,141 NDCs).
The remaining 4.5%, or 2824 drugs, did not have a clear pattern as to why they defied
categorization.216 As a result, the study eliminates the uncategorized pool of drugs from
analysis. The results and conclusions detailed below are based on the 95.5% that could be
defined as either brand or generic drug.
V.B.iii. Formulary-Specific Analysis
CMS began recording complete formulary data beginning in 2010. Thus, the analyses
regarding formularies only cover the eight-year period from 2010 to 2017.217 In contrast,
the analyses of brand versus generic drug availability, average drug-dosage unit price, and
average amount patient paid cover the entire 12-year period.
As noted above, formularies can have different numbers of tiers. Because formularies
with five tiers were the most common, the study chooses to focus its analyses across the
eight-year period on five-tier formularies. This choice imposes additional limitations on the
study: drug costs could have been markedly different in other formulary types.
Abridged sample Blue Cross Blue Shield five-tier formulary 218 .
an ‘NDC’ variable and a ‘BNvsGNN’ variable that allowed us to categorize the drugs, represented byNDCs,
as brand or generic.RxNorm, NIHU.S. National Library ofMedicine (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.
nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/rxnorm/index.html.
214 RxNorm RESTful Web API,NIHNationalLibraryofMedicineListerHillNationalCenter for
Biomedical Communications, https://rxnav.nlm.nih.gov/RxNormAPIREST.html
215 The study uses Cerner Multum’s database last to categorize the drugs because their methodology was
not exact and did not align exactly with the study’s methodology and purposes. Drug Database, Cerner
Corporation, https://www.cerner.com/solutions/drug-database.
216 These drugs usually had no formulary tier status and were not purchased often (which translates to a
relatively low number of drug purchase entries in the data). Some of these drugs were strips, syringes, and
OTC drugs.
217 Data Dictionaries, supra note 205; Part D Formulary File, Research Data Assistance Center (accessed
19 Aug. 2020), https://www.resdac.org/cms-data/files/part-d-formulary-file.
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Tier ID Drug type Description
01 Preferred generic Lowest-cost drugs, mostly generics
02 Nonpreferred generic Medium-cost drugs, mostly generics and
some brand-name drugs
03 Preferred brand High-cost drugs, mostly brand-name drugs
04 Nonpreferred brand Higher-cost drugs, mostly brand-name drugs
05 Specialty Highest-cost brand-name and generic drugs
V.C. Establishing Key Metrics
The study seeks to identify and measure game playing within the formulary tiering system.
The methodology hypothesized that brand drugs are being placed on preferred tiers,
whereas generic drugs are being placed in nonpreferred tiers, and that this behavior
is increasing across time. In order to accomplish the qualitative analysis, the study
examines:
• Generic and brand drug availability across 2006–17
• Patient expenditure for generic and brand drugs across 2006–17
• Significance in cost difference of generic drugs on different tiers, 2010–17
• Significance in cost difference of brand drugs on different tiers, 2010–17
• Significance in cost difference of generic and brand drugs on the same tiers, 2010–17
• Estimated cost to Medicare society of irrational formulary tier placement, 2010–17
V.C.i. Drug Availability
Drug availability in Figure 1 represents the number of unique drugs in all drug purchase
events. All drug purchase events are dated by a prescription service date variable split into
corresponding years over the study period of 2006–17.219 Within each year, the analysis
counts the number of unique NDCs (y-axis on Figure 1 ).
V.C.ii. Patient Expenditure—Average Amount Patient Paid
Each drug purchase event has a corresponding ‘Gross Drug Cost’ number that represents
the price paid for the drug at point of sale (ie the pharmacy counter).220 The Gross Drug
219 RX Service Date, ResearchData Assistance Center, https://www.resdac.org/cms-data/variables/rx-
service-date.











ollege of the Law
 user on 17 August 2021
52 • The devil in the tiers
Cost number does not include any rebates or discounts. Appendix A1 includes a detailed
explanation of costs, fees, and taxes that determine the Gross Drug Cost.221
Patients pay a part of each drug purchase event’s Gross Drug Cost. All drug purchase
events have a corresponding variable indicating how much the patient paid (without being
reimbursed by a third party). 221 The Average Amount Patient Paid in Figure 2 (see
Methodology section 5.2.2.) represents the average payment made by patients for a drug
in all drug purchase events.
To calculate Average Amount Patient Paid, the study first splits up all the drug purchase
events into corresponding years. The study then splits all drug purchase events within their
year into brand or generic drug groups based on their associated NDC (see Problems and
Solutions section 4.2.2.).Within each annual brand or generic category, the study then adds
up all the patient payment amounts and divided them by the number of drug purchase
events in each. The calculation is as follows:
Average Amount Patient Paid =
∑n
i=1 PDE Patient Paid Amounti
n
where n is the number of drug purchase events in either the brand or generic drug category
in a given year.
V.C.iii. Patient Expenditure—Average Dosage-Unit Price
After splitting up all the drug purchase events into their annual brand or generic groups, the
study calculates every drug purchase event’s Drug Dosage-Unit Price by dividing the Gross
Drug Cost over the drug’s quantity dispensed.223 The average dosage-unit price was then
calculated by taking the arithmetic mean of all the Dosage-Unit Prices within the annual
brand or generic group.
Drug Dosage-Unit Price = PDE Gross Drug Cost
Quantity Dispensed
Average Dosage-Unit Price =
∑n
i=1 Drug Dosage-Unit Pricei
n
221 See Appendix A1. Note that CMS does not provide the data for ingredient cost, sales tax, dispensing fee,
or vaccination fee (if applicable) that make up the Gross Drug Cost. CMS does not provide the data to
this level of detail because the data are considered commercially sensitive information. Even if the data are
commercially sensitive information, it is easy to see how this holds potential for game playing to any of
the players in the drug supply chain that can benefit from avoiding transparency. This supports the idea
that increased transparency is a possible solution to the problem identified in this paper. See Section 4.2.1.
Transparency.
222 Amound Paid by Patient, Research Data Assistance Center, https://www.resdac.org/cms-data/varia
bles/Patient-Pay-Amount.
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where n is the number of drug purchase events in either the brand or generic drug category
in a given year.
V.C.iii.a. Including Rebates into Average Dosage-Unit Price
As previously mentioned, the Gross Drug Cost variable provided by CMS does not include
any drugmanufacturer rebates or discounts. Therefore, the average dosage-unit price calcu-
lated above, derived from the Gross Drug Cost, also does not factor in rebates. Rebates are
providedbybrand companies, not by generics.224 CMSprovides aggregate rebate figures for
each year.225 In order to establish a fair comparison between the cost of brand versus generic
drugs, the analysis applies average percentage rebates on the average dosage-unit prices for
brand drugs.226 This new calculation is represented in Figure 1 as the ‘Brand After Rebate’
variable.
V.C.iv. Formulary Analysis—Average Percentage Generic/Brand Drugs Per Tier
The study first splits all drug purchase events into their annualized brand or generic groups.
For Figure 4 (see Methodology section 5.3.1.), it started with a pool of all drug purchase
events associated with a generic drug in a given year, then calculated what percentage of all
those drugs were on Tier 1, what percentage of all those drugs were on Tier 2, and so on,
until Tier 5.227 For Figure 5 (seeMethodology section 5.3.1.), the exact same calculations
were done, except with brand drugs.
V.C.v. Formulary Analysis—Significance in Cost Differences
Several factors determine drug tier placement, the most critical of which is cost-
effectiveness. The analysis tests the logic of brand and generic spread (based on drug cost)
across formulary tiers. For example, did the price of generics or brand drugs vary across the
five tiers such that placing the drugs on different tiers make sense? To answer this question,
224 Ctrs. forMedicare &Medicaid Servs., 2018Medicare Trustees Report.
225 Eg id, at 147 n.4 (explaining that the numbers provided onTable IV.B8. for annual manufacturer rebates are
‘expressed as a percentage of total drug costs’).
226 See supraAppendix A2 for detailed calculations of rebates. These average rebate percentages were obtained
from annual Medicare Trustees Reports. Trustees Reports (current and prior), https://www.cms.gov/Re
search-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/TrusteesRe
ports.html. The average rebate percentages in these reports are calculated across all Part D prescription
drugs (both brand and generic drugs). Therefore, the analysis had to modify these rebates in order to
make them reflect rebates for brand drugs only. The analysis does so by assuming that generic drugs
do not have rebates. See also 2011 Medicare Trustees Report, supra note 112, at 183 (stating that
‘generic drugs . . . typically do not carry manufacturer rebates. Many brand-name prescription drugs carry
substantial rebates’) (emphasis added).
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Table 1. Average dosage-unit price for generic drugs per tier
Generic average dosage-unit price ($)
Tier ID (row) Year
(column)
01 02 03 04 05
2010 1 2 3 10 29
2011 1 2 3 13 39
2012 1 2 5 13 59
2013 1 2 3 10 44
2014 1 2 3 7 15
2015 1 1 2 6 33
2016 1 1 2 6 34
2017 1 1 2 6 41
Table 2. Net average dosage-unit price for brand drugs per tier
Brand drug average dosage-unit price ($)
Tier ID (row) Year
(column)
01 02 03 04 05
2010 1 12 11 26 365
2011 1 12 13 41 368
2012 2 11 16 31 459
2013 1 5 17 27 562
2014 1 10 16 35 471
2015 1 3 20 36 439
2016 1 4 20 47 481
2017 1 5 21 50 524
statistical analyses checked whether there were statistically significant differences in the
average dosage-unit price across formulary tiers. If the answer to the question is yes, then
one would expect to see statistically significant differences in the average dosage-unit prices
across the tiers; specifically, onewould expect to see a significant increase in average dosage-
unit prices as the tier number increases—that is, moving from preferred to nonpreferred
tiers.
Three tests were performed: (i) a two-sided Kruskal–Wallis H test among generics only,
(ii) the same test among brand drugs only, and (iii) a two-sided Mann–Whitney U test
among generic and brand drugs placed on the same tier.228 The data that are graphed onto
Figure 6 (Methodology section 5.3.2.) is shown below on Tables 1 and 2.
228 These statistical tests check if there is a significant difference between two groups. The Kruskal–Wallis test
is a nonparametric test that can be applied on non-normal distributions; the Tukey test performs pairwise
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Table 3. Pairwise comparisons of average dosage-unit price for generic




Group 1 Group 2
01 02 0.625 −7.7892 9.0392 Not Rejected
01 03 1.875 −6.5392 10.2892 Not rejected
01 04 7.875 −0.5392 16.2892 Not rejected
01 05 35.75 27.3358 44.1642 Rejected
02 03 1.25 −7.1642 9.6642 Not rejected
02 04 7.25 −1.1642 15.6642 Not rejected
02 05 35.125 26.7108 43.5392 Rejected
03 04 6 −2.4142 14.4142 Not rejected
03 05 33.875 25.4608 42.2892 Rejected
04 05 27.875 19.4608 36.2892 Rejected
V.C.v.a. Significance in Cost Difference of Generic Drugs on Different Tiers
In this section, the study examines whether generic drugs, based on their average dosage-
unit price, should be assigned to five different formulary tiers or to a smaller number of tiers.
The hypothesis was that generic drugs placed on different formulary tiers have significantly
different average dosage-unit prices.229 The Kruskal–Wallis H test, which determines if
there are statistically significant differences between groups of an independent variable on
a continuous dependent variable, was applied.
The resultant P-value was 2.3E−07, far less than the standard significance level of
0.05. Therefore, this gives one reason to accept the hypothesis, namely that generic drugs
placed on different formulary tiers have significantly different average dosage-unit prices.
However, the test itself does not indicate which tiers have significant average dosage-unit
price differences compared with the other tiers. Therefore, the study opted to perform pair-
wise comparisons between the formulary tiers to find the tier pairs that feature significant
differences in average dosage-unit price using the Tukey test, a statistical test that is used
to find means that are significantly different from each other.230 The results are shown in
Table 3.
From Table 3’s results, the following conclusions can be drawn:
229 Null Hypothesis: All generic drugs that are placed on different formulary tiers (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) have equal
average dosage-unit prices or no significant differences among them. The cost criterion for the placement
of generic drugs is not met. Alternative Hypothesis: Generic drugs placed on different formulary tiers have
significantly different average dosage-unit prices. Hence, the cost criterion for the placement of generic
drugs is met.
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• There is evidence to reject the null hypothesis when performing the pairwise compar-
isons of generics placed on Tier 5 with the other tiers. The Tier 5 pairwise comparisons
have P-values that are <0.05 significance level. More simply, generic drugs placed on
Tier 5 have significant differences in average dosage-unit price fromgeneric drugs placed
on the other formulary tiers (1, 2, 3, and 4).
• There are no significant differences in the average dosage-unit price among Tiers 1, 2,
3, and 4. In other words, generics placed on Tiers 1, 2, 3, and 4 have similar average
dosage-unit prices and could theoretically be placed on a single formulary tier.
• Therefore, all generics could theoretically be divided and placed between only two
formulary tiers instead of spreading them across five tiers.231
V.C.v.b. Significance in Cost Difference of Brand Drugs on Different Tiers
In this section, the study examines whether brand drugs, based on their average dosage-unit
price, should be assigned to five different formulary tiers or to a smaller number of tiers.
The hypothesis was that brand drugs placed on different formulary tiers have significantly
different average dosage-unit prices using the same Kruskal–Wallis H test that was applied
in the previous analysis of generic drugs.232
The resultant P-value was 2.3E−06, which is less than the standard significance level
of 0.05. Therefore, this gives us reason to accept the hypothesis, namely that brand drugs
placed on different formulary tiers have significantly different average dosage-unit prices.
However, since the test itself does not indicate which pairs of tiers have significant average
dosage-unit price differences, another examination tested pairwise comparisons between
formulary tiers on brand drugs using the Tukey test in a similar manner to the previous
analysis on generics.
From Table 4’s results, the following conclusion can be drawn:
• There is evidence to reject the null hypothesis when performing the pairwise compar-
isons of the average dosage-unit prices between Tiers 1, 2, 3, and 4, except between
Tiers 1 and 2. In other words, there is no significant difference in average dosage-unit
231 Operating on the assumption that drug cost is the critical determinant for drug placement on formulary
tiers.
232 Null Hypothesis: All brand drugs that are placed on different formulary tiers (1, 2, 3, and 4.) have equal
dosage-unit price averages or no significant differences among them. The cost criterion for the placement
of brand drugs is not met. Alternative Hypothesis: Brand drugs placed on different formulary tiers have
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Table 4. Pairwise comparisons of average dosage-unit price for brand drugs—





01 02 6.625 −0.3824 13.6324 Not rejected
01 03 15.625 8.6176 22.6324 Rejected
01 04 35.5 28.4926 42.5074 Rejected
02 03 9 1.9926 16.0074 Rejected
02 04 28.875 21.8676 35.8824 Rejected
03 04 19.875 12.8676 26.8824 Rejected
prices between brand drugs on Tiers 1 and 2; therefore the brand drugs on these tiers
can theoretically be placed on the same formulary tier.
V.C.v.c. Significance in Cost Difference of Generic and Brand drugs on the Same Tiers
Formularies are supposed to be designed so that brand and generic drugs are generally
separated onto different tiers, with the exception that specialty generics and specialty brand
drugs are supposed to be placed together on Tier 5. Even though Tiers 1 and 2 are primarily
designated for generics, and Tiers 3 and 4 are primarily designated for brand drugs,233 the
results indicate that a combination of brand drugs and generic drugs appear on all tiers.
Thus, the study seeks to examine the cost criterion further to determine whether brand
drugs and generic drugs were appropriately placed together when on the same formulary
tiers.
The study tests the average dosage-unit price of brand and generic drugs that appear
on the same formulary tier in the data. If both the brand and generic categories of drugs
have equal or similar average dosage-unit prices, then the observed placement of brand and
generic drugs on the same tier is justified. If both categories have differences in average
dosage-unit prices that are statistically significant, then they should not be placed together
on the same formulary tier. To test these hypotheses, the methodology utilized a two-sided
Mann–Whitney U test.234 The results of applying the test in a pairwise manner between
brand drugs and generic drugs for each formulary tier are shown below, in Table 5.
From Table 5’s results, the following conclusions can be drawn:
233 Copayment Tier Definitions, supra note 10.
234 Null Hypothesis: Brand drugs and generic drugs placed on the same formulary tier have equal or similar
average dosage-unit prices. Therefore, they can be placed together on the same formulary tier and the cost
criterion for drug placement is met. Alternative Hypothesis: Brand drugs and generic drugs placed on the
same formulary tier have significantly different average dosage unit prices and should not be placed together
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Table 5.Mann–WhitneyP-Valuesbetweenaveragedosage-unit pricesof brand
and generic drugs per formulary tier
Tier ID P-value HypothesisNull
Brand drugs Generics
01 01 0.19078695 Not rejected
02 02 0.00037139 Rejected
03 03 0.00040731 Rejected
04 04 0.00044551 Rejected
05 05 0.00046955 Rejected
• There is evidence to reject the null hypotheses for Tiers 2, 3, 4, and 5. In other words,
brand drugs and generic drugs should not be placed together on these formulary tiers
based on the cost criterion. Brand drugs and generic drugs placed on Tier 1, however,
have similar average dosage unit prices and are justified in being placed together.
• Although Tier 5 allows the placement of both brand and generic drugs by default, the
difference between their average dosage-unit prices is large enough to be noted without










ollege of the Law
 user on 17 August 2021
